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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the law relating to closely-held companies. The paper 
considers empirical data relating to companies in New Zealand and finds that 
the majority of companies in New Zealand are "closely-held". The paper then 
considers the requirements of the Companies Act 1993 for the closely-held 
company majority in New Zealand. It concludes that the Companies Act's 
regulatory requirements imposed on directors to ensure accountability to 
shareholders do not have any benefit where companies are closely-held. The 
costs arising from such regulatory requirements are therefore unjustified. 
While the Companies Act makes assorted concessions to closely-held 
companies, these concessions have further issues. 
The paper therefore argues that New Zealand should adopt a new flexible and 
accessible statute designed to meet the needs of closely-held companies. This 
statute should be in addition to the existing Companies Act, and should be 
informed by comparative precedent. This paper argues that the key features of 
this statute should include removing the distinction between shareholders and 
directors. This in tum removes the need to impose regulatory requirements on 
directors in favour of shareholders. The paper also argues that the proposed 
new statute should provide for limited liability, with the consequence that 
regulatory requirements in favour of creditors are necessary. This paper 
argues that these regulatory requirements should take the form of a very 
straightforward duty to creditors. The closely-held form company would be 
available to natural persons, with an upper limit of ten principals. The paper 
therefore proposes a range of duties in favour of other principals in the case of 
multi-person closely-held companies, including duties to account for the 
property of the closely-held company, keep the other principals informed of 
relevant matters, and not to compete with the closely-held company. Most of 
these duties would be modifiable by agreement between the principals. 
Finally, the paper proposes that the statute include simple provisions relating 
to transacting business, eliminating the duplication between accounting and 
tax reporting requirements and allowing considerable informality for closely-
held companies. The net result is a simple, straightforward set of requirements 
suitable for closely-held companies in New Zealand, without onerous or 
unjustified compliance requirements. 
V 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes, 
appendices and bibliography) comprises approximately 12,300 words. 
Company Law - Closely-Held Companies - Small Businesses 
New Zealand - South Africa - United States 
Vl 
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the law relating to closely-held companies. The paper 
begins by considering empirical data relating to companies in New Zealand. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the paper finds that the majority of companies in New 
Zealand are "closely-held". That is, its shareholders are also its directors -
there is no separation of ownership and management. 
The paper then goes on to consider the provisions of the Companies Act 1993, 
in particular, its regulatory requirements. The paper endeavours to show how 
many of the regulatory requirements, designed to ensure the accountability of 
a company's directors to its shareholders, are inappropriate for closely-held 
companies. In particular, the paper attempts to show that there is no benefit 
from such requirements for closely-held companies, rendering compliance 
with such requirements an unjustified cost. 
The paper therefore concludes that New Zealand's current law is inadequate 
to meet the needs of closely-held companies and proposes changes to the 
existing law. The paper argues that the issues would be best-addressed by a 
new statute designed to meet the needs of closely-held companies. It considers 
the general principles that may inform the design of such a statute, and makes 
specific design recommendations for the new statute. In the traditions of the 
Law Commission's proposals for company law reform, 1 the paper also sets 
out possible draft clauses for the new statute. The recommendations for 
reform are based on this paper' s empirical findings and identified issues. The 
paper is also influenced by comparative international precedent, particularly 
that of South Africa2 and the United States. 3 
1 New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9, 
Wellington, 1989), paras 5-7. ["Law Commission Company Law Report"]. 
2 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA). 
3 This paper uses the examples of the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat 
title 17 chapter 15 (1977), and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, Chicago, Illinois, 1996) <http: //www.nccusl.org> (last accessed 15 July 
2006) ["Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996)"]. 
II EMPIRICAL INFORMATION 
This section of the paper analyses the nature of companies in New Zealand. In 
particular, it focuses on the ownership structure of New Zealand companies to 
attempt to determine the proportion that are "closely-held". For the purposes 
of this paper, a company is considered "closely-held" if its owners 
(shareholders) are involved in, or close to (for example, through family ties), 
the management of that company.
4 
A The Available Information 
This paper considers the following statistical and empirical infonnation in its 
analysis of the nature of companies in New Zealand:
5 
(i) Companies Office statistics.6 These statistics are accurate as at July 
2006 and are representative of all companies in New Zealand; 
(ii) The Ministry of Economic Development's Small Business 
Directorate's report entitled SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and 
Dynamics.7 This report provides a statistical overview of New 
Zealand small and medium-sized enterprises (not companies
8
) m 
New Zealand; 
4 Other factors that may be considered in other contexts include the number of shareholders, 
Jack of a market for the shares and even the geographical proximity and relationship of the 
shareholders with each other - see Baruch Gitlin "When Is Corporation Close, or Closely-
Held, Corporation Under Common or Statutory Law [sic]" (2003) 111 American Law Reports 
5th 207, § 2[a]. 
5 Not all of this information is necessarily based on objectively-verifiable data. Each source of 
information has strengths and weaknesses as noted. 
6 Companies Office Statistics (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the 
Companies Office, Business Services Branch, Ministry of Economic Development) . See also 
<http://www.companies.govt.nz> (last accessed 18 August 2006). 
7 Ministry of Economic Development SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and Dynamics - 2006 
(Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2006) <http ://www.med.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 18 August 2006). 
8 See below, contrasting closely-held companies with small and medium-sized enterprises and 
businesses. 
2 
(iii) Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in 
New Zealand: Report of the Small Business Advisory Group 2004.9 
This report is written by a group of small business owners. This 
report, although based on first-hand experiences, does not claim to 
be statistically-valid; 
(iv) PricewaterhouseCoopers Bank Lending Practices to Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises. 10 This report summarises the findings 
from interviews with seven major banks as to their lending 
practices to small and medium-sized enterprises in New Zealand; 
(v) Statistics New Zealand Business Finance in New Zealand 2004. 11 
This report is based on a survey of businesses in New Zealand 
relating to the demand for, and access to, debt and equity finance. 
While it is a statistical survey, it is based on businesses' responses 
and perceptions rather than primary data; 
(vi) Business New Zealand and KPMG Summary Report of the 
Business New Zealand-KPMG Compliance Cost Survey. 12 This 
survey attempts to determine compliance cost issues for businesses 
in New Zealand. This survey is again based on perceptions by self-
selecting respondents. It is not based on primary data; and 
(vii) Conversation of author with a chartered accountant practising in 
the area of small businesses and closely-held companies. This 
information is based on first-hand experiences and impressions. 
9 Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of 
the Small Business Advisory Group 2004 (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 
2004) <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 18 August 2006). 
10 PricewaterhouseCoopers Bank Lending Practices to Small and Medium Sized Ente,prises 
(Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2003) <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 18 August 2006). 
11 Statistics New Zealand Business Finance in New Zealand 2004) (Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2004) <http://www.stats.govt.nz> (last accessed 18 August 2006). 
12 Business New Zealand and KPMG Summa,y Report of the Business New Zealand-KPMG 
Compliance Cost Survey (Business New Zealand and KPMG, Wellington, 2005) 
<http://www.businessnz.org.nz> (last accessed 18 August 2006). 
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It is important to note that some of the above information relates to 
"businesses" or "enterprises", rather than "companies". It is possible to 
operate a business in a variety of legal forms, only one of which is a limited 
liability company registered under the Companies Act. There are, for 
example, over 431 ,000 registered companies, 
13 but only 334,000 enterprises. 
14 
Further, much of the available infonnation is concerned with the size of the 
business (particularly small and medium-sized businesses 
15), rather than its 
ownership structure (that is, whether it is closely-held or not). 
The focus of this paper is the particular legal framework that should apply to 
closely-held companies, regardless of their size. As will be seen, the 
ownership structure of a closely-held company is highly determinative of the 
appropriateness of the regulatory requirements applicable to it. Nevertheless, 
there will be overlaps between closely-held companies and small businesses. 
Many small businesses will be closely-held companies, often with families or 
friends as shareholders and directors. 
16 
This paper therefore references all available empirical data, including data not 
specific to companies. The paper does acknowledge, however, that the extent 
of the correlation between closely-held companies and small and medium-
sized businesses is somewhat uncertain. There are therefore some 
approximations involved in applying small and medium-sized business data to 
the circumstances of closely-held companies. 
13 Companies Office statistics, see above, n 6. 
14 Ministry of Economic Development SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and Dynamics -
2006, above n 7, 6. Given that enterprises include other non-company forms of trading entity 
(for example, partnerships and sole traders) logically enterprises should be the larger group. 
The difference is probably explained by consolidated groups of companies operating as a 
single enterprise, or "shelf' or non-active companies that do not undertake any business 
activities and do not count as an enterprise. 
15 The criteria for small or medium enterprises are also not settled. The New Zealand statistics 
referenced in this paper primarily rely on the number of full time-equivalent employees, with 
5 or less representing a "small" business and 6 to 19 representing a "medium" business - see, 
in particular, Ministry of Economic Development SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and 
Dynamics - 2006, above n 7, 5-6. 
16 See Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: 
Report of the Small Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 9, 3-4 . 
4 
B Number of Closely-Held Companies 
There are no direct statistics available on the exact number of companies with 
shareholders involved in management. The Small Business Advisory Group 
however, considers that the "typical" small and medium-sized enterprise will 
"have the owner as the only person in a managerial position, and no board or 
formal governance arrangements". 17 Referencing the figures for small and 
medium-sized businesses, some 96 per cent of New Zealand businesses fit 
within this category. 18 
This reflects Companies Office statistics: 19 New Zealand has over 431,000 
limited liability companies registered under the Companies Act. Of these 
companies, 140,000 have only one shareholder (33 per cent of all companies), 
186,000 have two shareholders (43 per cent) and 80,000 have three to five 
shareholders (18 per cent). In total, 408,000 companies (nearly 95 per cent) 
have five or fewer shareholders. The popularity of the limited liability 
company has undoubtedly been enhanced by matters such as a robust 
approach to limited liability,20 ease of incorporation,2 1 succession and family 
planning advantages,22 and the potential for income splitting and lack of tax 
disadvantages. 23 
While unification of ownership and management is not the same as number of 
shareholders in a company, there is some correlation between the number of 
17 Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of 
the Small Business Adviso,y Group 2004, above n 9, 3-4. 
18 Ministry of Economic Development SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and Dynamics -
2006, above n 7, 6. 
19 Companies Office Statistics, above n 6. Figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand. 
20 See Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) and Lord Cooke ofThomdon "A 
Real Thing" in A Borrowdale, D Rowe and L Taylor (eds) Company Law Writings: A New 
Zealand Collection (The Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law, Christchurch, 2002), 21. 
2 1 To incorporate a company in New Zealand, a person is only required to complete a 
straightforward form and pay a fee - see Companies Act 1993, s 12 and Companies Act 1993 
Regulations 1994, First Schedule, Form 1. This can be completed entirely on-line - see 
Companies Act 1993, s 360( 4) and <http://www.companies.govt.nz> (last accessed 18 August 
2006). The fees are also very low. To incorporate a company, the total fee is only $125 ($100 
incorporation plu $25 name reservation). This drops further to $60 ($50 incorporation plus 
$10 name reservation) if done on-line - see Companies Act 1993 Regulations 1994, reg 5 and 
Second Schedule, Part 1. 
22 See, forexample,Maw vMaw [1981] 1 NZLR25 (CA). 
23 See, in particular, Income Tax Act 2004, s HG 1 (relating to loss attributing qualifying 
companies). 
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shareholders and their involvement in management. In particular, it 1s 
necessary to have a relatively small number of shareholders to have them 
practicably involved in management (although this factor on its own is not 
sufficient to make a company closely-held). The number of shareholders 
therefore provides some guidance as to whether a company is closely-held or 
not. The exact number of shareholders beyond which it is not practicably 
possible for all shareholders to be involved in management is not settled in 
existing law. By any measure, however, it will be greater than five 
shareholders. Other New Zealand statutes that differentiate between different 
companies on the basis of number of shareholders without exception use a 
figure of at least five. 24 
As discussed, the above figures cannot be considered conclusive as to the 
number of closely-held companies in New Zealand. Not necessarily all of the 
96 per cent of businesses that are small or medium-sized will be closely-held, 
nor the 95 per cent of companies that have five or fewer shareholders. Some 
may have shareholders that are not involved in management; others may be 
subsidiaries of larger widely-held companies with professional independent 
directors. Nevertheless, this paper considers that it is fair to conclude that 
closely-held companies make up a significant number of New Zealand 
compames. 
C Other Information 
Two other matters ansmg from the empirical information are also worth 
briefly noting: synonymity and informality. These are both characteristics of 
closely-held companies that are relevant for the purposes of this paper. 
?4 - For example, the Takeovers Act 1993 uses (among other factors) a figure of 50 
shareholders - see Takeovers Act 1993, s 2 definition of "specified company" and Takeovers 
Code, clause 3, definition of "code company" (note, however, that the Securities Legislation 
Bill will amend the definitions of "specified" and "code" companies to remove the reference 
to $20 million or more assets - see Securities Legislation Bill 2005, no 234-2, cls 33 and 34.) 
The Financial Reporting Act 1993 uses 25 shareholders - see Financial Reporting Act 1993, s 
6(g). Finally, the Income Tax Act 2004 allows companies that have 5 or less shareholders that 
are natural persons to elect to become loss attributing qualifying companies - see Income Tax 
Act 2004, s HG!. Internationally, the South African Close Corporations Act 1984 uses 10 
members - see Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 2(1). 
6 
1 Synonymity 
By definition, the directors of a closely-held company will also be its 
shareholders. There is obviously an alignment of interests in this respect. This 
synonymity is, however, reinforced by several other matters apparent from the 
empirical information. In particular, the livelihoods of directors/shareholders 
will be largely synonymous with the fortunes of their companies. A 
significant majority of small and medium-sized businesses' capital IS 
contributed by the individuals in control of the business.25 This IS 
compounded by the use of personal guarantees for debt finance. While only 
one-quarter to one-third of small-and-medium businesses seek loans,26 the 
directors/shareholders of those that do will probably have to give a personal 
guarantee for the debts of the company (there is, however, some conflicting 
data on this point).27 Finally, the directors/shareholders will probably also be 
employed by the business.28 This means that the principal(s) may also be 
25 See Statistics New Zealand Business Finance in New Zealand 2004), above n 11, 24 and 
70. In summary, the paid-in capital for small businesses is 87 percent from the individuals in 
control of the business, and a further 3 per cent from family or friends of those in control. For 
medium businesses, paid-in capital is 84 per cent from the individuals in control of the 
business, and a further 1 per cent from family or friends of those in control. 
26 See Statistics New Zealand Business Finance in New Zealand 2004, above n 10, 9 and 50. 
In summary, 26 per cent of small businesses receive debt finance; 37 per cent of medium 
businesses receive debt finance. 
27 See PricewaterhouseCoopers Bank Lending Practices to Small and Medium Si:::ed 
Ente1prises, above n 10, 29-31. In summary, actual bank data tends to indicate approximately 
two-thirds of loans to small businesses are backed by security taken over residential property. 
The report notes that some banks estimate this figure to be as high as 80 per cent. This is also 
reflected in the findings of the Small Business Advisory Group, which considers that the 
typical small-to-medium enterprise will "have all personal assets, including the owner's 
home, committed as security for the business" - see Small Business Advisory Group Small 
and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small Business Adviso,y Group 2004, 
above n 9, 3. The PricewaterhouseCoopers report also cites, however, a further (confidential) 
survey that estimates this figure to be as low as 35-40 per cent - see PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Bank Lending Practices to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, above n 10, 30. Similarly, 
Statistics New Zealand estimates that only 28 per cent of loans to small businesses are 
secured by personal assets, while only 29 per cent of loans to medium business are secured by 
personal assets. Of those that do give security, residential property is given as security for 82 
and 73 per cent of small and medium businesses respectively - see Statistics New Zealand 
Business Finance in New Zealand 2004, above n 10, 30-31 and 78. The survey does, however, 
note that the overall rate of personal security for small businesses is lower than expected, and 
notes the findings of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report. The PricewaterhouseCoopers report 
is based on bank data, whereas the Statistics New Zealand report is based on business 
responses. This paper considers that bank data is more likely to be accurate and therefore the 
findings of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report more reliable. 
28 Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of 
the Small Business Adviso,y Group 2004, above n 9, 3. See also Ministry of Economic 
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dependent on the company for their day-to-day mcome. The 
directors/shareholders' invested capital, the family home and other assets, and 
day-to-day income may all be at risk in the event of business failure. 
2 Informality 
The empirical evidence also tends to indicate that most closely-held 
companies operate informally, and do not strictly observe all regulatory 
requirements.29 This lack of formal compliance can occur in a number of 
ways. Matters may be neglected by accident or oversight,30 due to ignorance 
of the law or lack of capacity, 31 failure to seek professional advice, 32 or even 
by reckless or deliberate disregard of the legal requirements. 33 In addition to 
non-compliance, "informal compliance" may also occur. For example, rather 
than attending to ongoing obligations as they are technically required, these 
Development SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and Dynamics - 2006, above n 7, 6 - in 
summary, some 63 per cent of enterprises have no employees. Without employees, the only 
way for the enterprise to act is through its directors (although many of this figure are likely to 
be asset-owning companies that do not actively trade on a day-to-day basis. No-employee 
companies may also be start-up or part-time businesses, where the director(s)/shareholder(s) 
work for the company without direct remuneration (salary or wages) in the hope of 
establishing a viable business, or rely on income from dividends). 
29 Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New Zealand: Report of 
the Small Business Adviso,y Group 2004, above n 9, 3-4. See, for example, Mason v Lewis 
(2006) 9 NZCLC 264,024 (CA), para 58, Judgment of the Court. 
30 See, for example, Re Economy Service Ltd (aft cit Caddis v Roskam) (1997) 8 NZCLC 
261,441 (HC). 
31 See, for example, Hale v Registrar of Companies (28 September 2006) HC AK CRI-2005-
404-241; CRI-2005-404-237, in particular paras 7, 9 and 10, Potter J. See also David Goddard 
"Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience" in A Borrowdale, D 
Rowe and L Taylor (eds) Company Law Writings: A New Zealand Collection, above n 20, 
145, 166. 
32 See, for example, Business New Zealand and KPMG Summary Report of the Business New 
Zealand-KPMG Compliance Cost Survey, above n 12, Summary Tables and Graphs, Table 
47. In summary, only 28 per cent of small businesses use external advice. This figure rises to 
approximately 40 per cent for medium-sized businesses. Given company law is not 
straightforward, it is unlikely that the remaining 60 to 70 per cent are completely compliant 
with all relevant obligations. See also Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium 
Businesses in New Zealand: Report of the Small Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 9, 3-
4. 
33 See, for example, Re Cellar House Ltd (Jn Liquidation) (aft cit Walker v Allen) (18 March 
2004) HC NEL CP13/00, paras 133, 143, 180 and 209-211, Ellen France J, and Mason v 
Lewis, above n 29, para 58, Judgment of the Court. 
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obligations may be addressed m an end-of-year "wash-up" of legal 
· 34 reqmrements. 
III IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A Regulatory Requirements 
Company law imposes numerous regulatory requirements m an effort to 
prevent potential abuse of the corporate form. While some of these 
requirements fall on companies directly35 (and in some exceptional 
circumstances, shareholders36), the majority of company regulation imposes 
requirements on directors, as the individuals with the power to control a 
company. 37 
These regulatory requirements on directors take a number of forms, including: 
(i) Imposing general duties on directors;38 
(ii) Substantive restrictions on certain actions;39 
(iii) Structural distribution of powers within a company;40 and 
(iv) Procedural requirements.41 
Generally, such requirements may be described as being for the benefit of 
shareholders and creditors42 - those in the position of relative vulnerability to 
abuse of the corporate form by directors. The interests of other stakeholders 
34 
David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31 , 165. 
35 For example, use of company name - see Companies Act 1993, s 25, in particular subs 
(5)(a). 
36 See, for example, McCullagh v Gellert (aft cit Re Gellert Developments Ltd (In 
Liquidation)) (2002) 9 NZCLC 262,942 (HC). 
37 Companies Act 1993, s 128. 
38 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 131-138. 
39 For example, prohibiting distributions in breach of the solvency test and prohibiting 
entering transactions that cannot satisfy the solvency test - see Companies Act 1993, ss 4, 52, 
108 and 137. 
4° For example, reserving control of major transactions to shareholders - see Companies Act 
1993, s 129. 
41 
For example, the assorted "disclosure" requirements that are considered immediately below 
- see below, n 49-52 . 
42 
See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 19 and 23 . 
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(for example, customers, employees, the environment and so on) are nonnally 
addressed outside company law in other specific legislation.43 
In relation to shareholders,44 the regulatory requirements have a number of 
specific aims. First, they make directors accountable to shareholders 
(primarily via "the company"45) for actions that may prejudice the position of 
shareholders. This includes both liability to make good wrongs suffered by 
shareholders46 and liability to account for personal benefits gained that have 
been denied to shareholders.47 Second, they attempt to ensure shareholders48 
are informed of relevant matters through assorted "disclosure" requirements.49 
Disclosure further promotes accountability by ensuring that shareholders can 
make informed decisions,50 and by encouraging good directorial decision 
43 See, for example, Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 17-19, LS 
Sealy "Directors' 'Wider' Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural" 
(1987) 13 Monash U LR 164, R Baxt "Can the Law Relating to Directors ' Duties be 
Refom1ed?" (1990) 10 Company and Securities Law Journal 110, 114-115, and Australian 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Company Directors' Duties 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989), paras 6.1 and following 
["Cooney Report"]. 
44 The position of creditors is discussed below - see below, Part V C - Creditors, Limited 
Liability and Regulatory Requirements. 
45 See below, Part V C 4 - Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
46 For example, supervising the share register (see Companies Act 1993 , ss 90 and 169(3)). 
This can be considered a "negative" duty - directors must not act against the interests of 
shareholders. 
47 For example, requiring directors to act in the best interests of the company (see Companies 
Act 1993, s 131) and restrictions on self-interested transactions (see Companies Act 1993, .ss 
139-140). This can be considered a "positive" duty - directors must act in the interests of 
shareholders. See, for example, Bridge v M B Cook & Co Ltd (16 September 1999) HC 
CHCH CP53/99, Chisholm J. 
48 The Law Commission identified shareholders as the primary audience for disclosure by 
companies and directors - see Law Commission Company Law Report, n 1, paras 192, 494 
and 610-623. Note that the Law Commission identifies the public generally in having an 
interest in disclosures by companies. This disclosure is, however, limited to "matters required 
for identification of the company and the information required by those having legal dealings 
with it" - Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, para 616. See also Hale v 
Registrar of Companies, above n 31, para 25, Potter J. 
49 "Disclosure" includes the assorted record-keeping, certification and notice requirements -
see, for example Companies Act 1993 , ss 41-81 (matters to do with shares, including issues, 
distributions, acquisitions of own shares by the company and redemptions), ss 120 and 122 
(annual meeting of shareholders or resolution in lieu), s 129 (major transactions), s 140 
(disclosure of self-interested transactions), ss 160, 189(1)(b), 189(l)(d), 189(l)(e) and third 
schedule clause 6 (recording minutes of all meetings and resolutions of shareholders and 
directors), ss l 89(l)(h), 189(l)(i) and 194 (maintaining accounting records and financial 
statements), ss 208, 209 and 211 (annual report to shareholders), and Financial Reporting Act 
1993, ss 10-14 (annual financial statements). 
5° For example, as to the directors' performance in running the company and using 
shareholders' funds. This in tum informs matters such as shareholders' financial position, 
whether to remain in the company or whether to exercise their powers of discipline over 
10 
making51 and business disciplines. 52 Finally, the regulatory requirements 
create a basis for liability.53 
The problem with this is, of course, that such requirements are a total 
nonsense for closely-held companies. There is no accountability of directors 
to shareholders where the directors are also the shareholders. Making good 
any wrongs suffered would amount to no more than a "money-go-round." 
Similarly, disclosure of information already known would be a "paper-go-
round" of records given and received by, and for the nominal benefit of, the 
same set of people. Even the good decision making and business discipline 
rationales are undermined by the practicalities of the reporting requirements.54 
Even if a director were to breach one of the requirements of the Companies 
Act, a shareholder-plaintiff is hardly likely to take action against him/herself 
as director-defendant. 55 
director management (with regard to the latter, see Companies Act 1993, s 109 (management 
review by shareholders), ss 153(2) and 156 ( appointment or removal of directors), and ss 165 
and 169 (holding directors liable for breach of their legal obligations). See also Law 
Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 198-199. 
51 For example, through the theory that "good processes are more likely to lead to good 
decisions". Requiring directors to minute decisions and/or certify certain actions "turns the 
directors' minds" to the appropriateness of the proposed action and whether it should be 
undertaken - see David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand 
Experience", above n 31 , 155-156, England and Wales Law Commission and the Scottish 
Law Commission Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a 
Statement of Duties (LAW COM No 261 ; SCOT LAW COM No 173, London, 1999) 
<www.lawcom.gov.uk> (last accessed 20 July 2006), paras 4.53-4.61 , Simon Deakin and 
Alan Hughes Directors' Duties: Empirical Findings (Report to the England and Wales Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge, 1999), Table 17, and Law Commission Company Law Report, 
above n 1, paras 494, 520-522 and clause 107 (paras 520-522 and clause I 07 relate to the 
"business judgment" rule. As to the business judgment rule, see below Part V C 5 -
Standard of care, in particular, n 196. 
52 See, for example, Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, para 601 and clause 
156, Mason v Lewis, above n 29, paras 85-87, Judgment of the Court, and Hale v Registrar of 
Companies , above n 31, para 25, Potter J. 
53 See Companies Act 1993, Part IX. 
54 Exempt companies (most smaller closely-held companies - see Financial Reporting Act 
1993, section 2) usually have up to nine months after the company's balance date to prepare 
financial statements (see Financial Reporting Act 1993, section 10(2). Note that this requires 
shareholder agreement) . While this time may be necessary to prepare accounts in most cases, 
the timeliness is likely to have an impact on the accuracy of the financial position portrayed in 
the financial statements. This potential lack of accuracy may undermine any business 
discipline or the reliance that can be placed on the financial statements for decision making. 
55 See also R Dugan "Closely Held Companies under the Draft Companies Act", (1990) 20 
VUWLR 161 , 172-173 . 
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Moreover, there is no need for such accountability. Directors do not need to 
be incentivised to act in the best interests of the shareholders. Self-interest and 
synonymity will take care of that. 56 The regulatory requirements imposed by 
the Companies Act are therefore inappropriate for closely-held companies. 
B Costs of the Requirements 
This section of the paper attempts to detennine the costs of the regulatory 
requirements for closely-held companies, thereby assessing the scale of the 
problem identified in the previous section. 
I Direct costs57 
The direct costs of complying with the majority of the requirements are 
probably not high. The majority of the disclosure requirements, 58 for example, 
can probably be satisfied with a few lines of text.59 Other requirements merely 
require directors to refrain from doing certain actions, only resulting in 
opportunity costs.6° Finally, some requirements (and associated costs) only 
arise infrequently - either annually61 or upon the company electing to 
56 See above, Part II C 1 - Synonymity. 
57 This terminology comes from the New Zealand Govenunent 's Regulatory Impact Analysis 
framework. This framework requires policy makers to consider the costs and benefits of a 
proposal as part of a "Regulatory Impact Analysis". In particular, it distinguishes between 
"direct" and "compliance" costs. Direct costs are those costs incurred to substantively comply 
with a particular requirement (for example, the direct cost of incorporating a company is the 
fee payable to the Registrar of Companies). "Compliance" costs, on the other hand, are those 
administrative costs associated with complying with a particular requirement, but that do not 
go directly to substantively complying with that requirement (for example, the compliance 
costs of incorporating a company are the time and effort, or the cost of professional advice, 
necessary to determine the legal requirements to incorporate a company). Direct costs could 
also be considered as the costs of the "end" and compliance costs the costs of the "means to 
the end" - see generally Ministry of Economic Development A Guide to Preparing 
Regulatory Impact Statements (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 1999), in 
particular, paras 1-3 and 63-71 <http: //www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 18 August 2006). 
58 See above, Part III A - Regulatory Requirements, in particular, n 49-52. 
59 For example, Companies Act 1993, s 140 ( disclosure of self-interested transactions), and ss 
160, 189(l)(b), 189(l)(d), 189(l)(e) and third schedule clause 6 (recording minutes of all 
meetings and resolutions of shareholders and directors). 
60 For example, Companies Act 1993, s 149 (restrictions on share dealings by directors). See 
also Thexton v Thexton [2002] 1 NZLR 780 (CA). 
61 
For example, Companies Act 1993, ss 120 and 122 (annual meeting of shareholders or 
resolution in lieu), ss 208, 209 and 211 (annual report to shareholders), and Financial 
Reporting Act 1993, ss 10-14 (annual financial statements). 
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undertake a particular course of action62 (although these requirements are 
more detailed and therefore more likely to be onerous). 
2 Compliance costs 
Much more significant are the compliance costs associated with the regulatory 
requirements. The technical nature of company law means that closely-held 
companies and/or their directors are likely to expend significant costs 
detennining their exact legal obligations. 63 If they choose to do it 
themselves,64 this will take the fonn of time and effort reading the Act or 
textbooks. Alternatively, it may take the form of the cost of professional 
advice. 
3 Quantitative assessment 
There do not appear to be any available quantitative assessments of the actual 
costs associated with the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act.65 A 
recent survey does, however, provide some guidance in this area. 66 Businesses 
were asked to rank their compliance cost "priorities". The joint requirements 
of the Companies Act, Takeovers Act 1993 and Securities Act 1978 were 
ranked the seventh top "priority". 67 The Companies Act aspect of this is most 
62 For example, Companies Act 1993, ss 41-81 (matters to do with shares, including issues, 
distributions, acquisitions of own shares by the company and redemptions). 
63 The Law Commission proposed a "codified" reference point of directors ' disclosure 
obligations - see Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, clause 179. This clause 
did not find its way into the Companies Act 1993 . In relation to accessibility of statute law, 
see also Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer, President, Law Commission "Law Reform and the Law 
Commission after 20 Years - We Need to Try a Little Harder" (Address to the New Zealand 
Centre for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 30 March 2006), Speech Notes, 
paras 34 and following. 
64 As is apparently the case for most smaller businesses - see above, Part II C 2 - Informality. 
65 In writing this paper, information to this effect was requested from both the New Zealand 
Law Society and New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants. Neither responded, 
however. 
66 Business New Zealand and KPMG Summa,y Report of the Business New Zealand-KPMG 
Compliance Cost Survey, above n 12. 
67 That is, these Acts impose the seventh highest compliance costs for business - see Business 
New Zealand and KPMG Summary Report of the Business New Zea!and-KPMG Compliance 
Cost Survey, above n 12, 5 and 7, and Summary Tables and Graphs, Table 14. The first six 
compliance cost issues are, in order of highest to lowest: tax, employment relations, health 
and safety, Accident Compensation Corporation requirements, holidays, Statistics New 
Zealand requirements, and "other" requirements. Interestingly, resource management was 
eighth, after the Companies Act. 
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significant, given that virtually no small businesses have to comply with the 
Takeovers Act68 or Securities Act.69 
The compliance costs may be mitigated somewhat for experienced directors 
and professional advisers through the use of standard-form templates. At best, 
however, this may reduce the Companies Act disclosure requirements to 
"nuisance" status - that is, something that must be done, but is not a 
significant compliance burden. 
4 Liability "traps" 
In addition to costs, regulatory requirements also carry the potential for 
liability "traps". As discussed, there does not appear to be any particular 
incentive for directors of closely-held companies to comply with the assorted 
regulatory requirements. There is neither any benefit, nor any particular 
likelihood of shareholder enforcement.70 In fact, many directors of closely-
held companies may not even be aware of the assorted requirements. 71 There 
are, however, a number of liability "traps" that may cause significant 
difficulties for unwary directors of closely-held companies. 
First, in terms of civil actions, if a company were to go into liquidation, its 
directors may find themselves pursued by the liquidator of the company for 
any failure to comply with the regulatory requirements. For example, if the 
directors have been paid remuneration by the company without complying 
68 The Takeovers Act 1993 only applies to listed and formerly-listed companies, and 
companies with 50 or more shareholders and $20 million or more assets - see Takeovers Act 
1993, s 2 definition of "specified company" and Takeovers Code, clause 3, definition of 
"code company". It is very unlikely a company could have 50 shareholders and still be 
considered "closely held". A company could, however, potentially be listed or formerly-listed 
and be closely-held. See also above, n 24. 
69 The Securities Act 1978 only applies to issuers of securities to the public - see Securities 
Act 1978, s 3 and Part 2. While closely-held companies could issue securities to the public 
(particularly debt and participatory securities), the majority of closely-held companies very 
probably do not. 
70 See above, Part III A - Regulatory Requirements. 
71 See, in particular, Small Business Advisory Group Small and Medium Businesses in New 
Zealand: Report of the Small Business Advisory Group 2004, above n 9, 3-4, and above, Part 
II C 2 - Informality. See also, for example, Mason v Lewis, above n 29, para 58, Judgment of 
the Court. 
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with the necessary formalities ,72 the remuneration may be treated as a loan 
from the company and the liquidator (acting for the company) may pursue the 
directors to "claw back" the deemed debt. 73 
Moreover, in the case of liquidation, directors may be required to make a 
contribution to the company if they have been guilty of negligence or default 
in complying with the Companies Act requirements, particularly the 
· · 74 accountmg reqmrements. 
Finally, state-enforced criminal sanctions may also be imposed for failure to 
comply with assorted requirements,75 in addition to any civil sanction. 76 There 
is therefore the prospect of criminal sanction, even if no-one has suffered any 
Joss or harm (although prosecutorial discretion would probably mean that 
breaches of the law that do not cause any harm would not be prosecuted). 
5 In summary 
In summary, the regulatory requirements of the Companies Act have some 
direct costs, significant compliance costs, and the potential for very significant 
liability traps. It should be re-emphasised, however, that the Companies Act 
regulatory requirements do not appear to have any significant benefit in the 
case of closely-held companies. No matter how small the costs, they will 
never be justifiable on a cost-benefit analysis if the benefit is zero. This paper 
therefore argues that the requirements are an unjustified burden on closely-
held companies. 
72 See Companies Act 1993, s 161. 
73 See, for example, McCu!lagh v Gellert, above n 36, Crichton v Amaru (2001) 9 NZCLC 
262,549 (HC), Kiwibilt Engineering Ltd (In Liquidation) v Pavlovich [2004] DCR 193, and 
Macfarlane v Barlow (1997) 8 NZCLC 261 ,470 (HC) (note, however, that this latter case was 
brought by a minority shareholder not involved in management of the company, rather than a 
liquidator. The company does therefore not satisfy this paper's definition of "closely-held"). 
74 Companies Act 1993, ss 300 and 301. See, for example, Mason v Lewis, above n 29, Re 
Cellar House Ltd (In Liquidation), above n 33 , and Re Hilltop Group Ltd (In Liquidation) (aft 
cit Lawrence v Jacobsen) (2001) 9 NZCLC 262,477 (HC). 
75 For the list of criminal sanctions in the Companies Act (including penalties), see 
Companies Act 1993, ss 373-374. 
76 See, in particular, Companies Act 1993, ss 300( 4) and 301 (2). 
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C Concessions to Closely-Held Companies 
The inappropriateness of certain regulatory requirements m the case of 
closely-held companies77 was recognised by the Law C01mnission. As a result 
of the "excessive formalities on the day-to-day operation of small (and, in 
particular, one-shareholder) companies", 78 the Law Commission proposed 
introducing a new section to the then-Companies Bill that would permit 
shareholders to effectively opt-out of these formalities. 79 In the Law 
Commission's view, shareholders should be entitled to waive matters for their 
benefit if they so desire. 80 The Companies Act was eventually enacted with 
h · · 81 sue opt-out prov1s10ns. There are, however, problems with these 
concessions as enacted. The net result of these issues is to undennine much of 
the greater flexibility anticipated by the Law Commission.82 
Putting aside the obvious additional compliance burdens associated with an 
opt-out rather than opt-in mechanism, the first issue is that not all regulatory 
77 While such measures are not necessarily limited to any particular sort of company, the 
practicalities of seeking - and obtaining - unanimous shareholder agreement mean that it is 
only likely to be used where the company is closely-held. Such opt-outs will presumably only 
occur where it is in the interests of shareholders to do so. 
78 New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Transition and Revision (NZLC Rl6, 
Wellington, 1990), para 45. 
79 New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Transition and Revision, above n 78, para 
45 and clause 78A. These comments were made in the Law Commission' s follow-up report 
on company law following criticisms made of the initial report's rather limited concessions to 
closely-held companies. As to the criticism made of the initial draft, see, New Zealand Law 
Commission Company Law Reform - Supplementa,y Paper No 2 - Closely Held Companies 
- Unanimous Shareholder Agreements (31 January 1990), paras 4-5 (Obtained under Official 
Information Act 1982 Request to the Regulatory and Competition Policy Branch, Ministry of 
Economic Development), and R Dugan "Closely Held Companies under the draft Companies 
Act", above n 55 . 
80 This is similar in concept to the doctrine of shareholder ratification - see Companies Act 
1993, section 177. Note, however, the potential limitation in subsection 177(3)) - see also 
Morrison's Company Law (NZ) (Service 82, LexisNexis NZ Limited), paras 25.42-25.44 
(updated July 2006) <http ://www.lexisnexis.co .nz> (last accessed 11 August 2006). 81 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 107(1)-107(3) (unanimous consent for matters 
including dividends, share transactions, financial assistance, director remuneration and other 
transactions where the director is interested), s 196(2) (unanimous resolution not to appoint an 
auditor), and s 211(3) (unanimous agreement that certain matters not be included in the 
annual report) . 
82 The Companies Act 1993 as enacted departs from the report of the Law Commission in a 
number of respects - see David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New 
Zealand Experience", above n 31, 156, Jenni McManus "Law Commission v Justice 
Department - Squabbling Officials Stall Company Law Reform" (25 October 1990) The 
Examiner, New Zealand, 5, and Bob Dey "Company Law - the Slow Job of Reform" (28 
October 1990) The Dominion, Wellington, 23. 
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requirements are subject to shareholder opt-out. The majority of the disclosure 
requirements, for example, fall into this category.83 Closely-held companies 
must therefore comply with these regulatory requirements, even though they 
are a "paper-go-round" without benefit. 
Second, even where shareholders are able to opt-out, different sections require 
different procedural formalities in order to opt-out.84 There is no common, 
simple framework for closely-held companies to address these assorted 
matters. This has resulted in a confusing array of differing provisions that 
closely-held companies must carefully consider, with ensuing compliance 
costs. One matter in this regard that may particularly frustrate shareholders is 
the inability to opt-out of some matters permanently, either by incorporating a 
permanent opt-out in the company's constitution or by passing "standing" 
unanimous resolutions. 85 This compounds the procedural formalities, as it is 
not possible for shareholders to tum their minds to the matter once and resolve 
it permanently. 86 
Finally, some of the procedural formalities of the Companies Act to effect an 
opt-out are problematic themselves. It is not clear what purpose these 
procedural formalities are intended to serve. The initial regulatory 
requirements which shareholders are seeking to opt-out of are to protect the 
interests of shareholders. In the disclosure requirements discussed above for 
example,87 the directors disclose some matter to the shareholders; the 
shareholders are the "recipients" of the protection. While in practice the 
"givers" and "recipients" of the disclosures will be the same person(s) for a 
closely-held company, they may be distinct groups. There is therefore some 
theoretical coherency to such requirements. The situation is different where 
83 See above, Part III A - Regulatory Requirements, in particular, n 49-52. 
84 For example, s 107 requires the opt-out agreement to be in writing. Th.is is not apparently 
required for, for example, the agreement that certain matters not be included in the annual 
report - compare Companies Act 1993, s 107( 4) with s 211 (3). 
85 For example, it is possible to opt-out "generally" from the requirements of s 107 until 
further notice, but the resolution not to appoint an auditor must be re-executed each year -
compare Companies Act 1993, ss 107(5)(b) and 107(6), with Companies Act 1993 s 196(2). 
86 See also David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand 
Experience", above n 31, 156-158. 
87 See above, Part III A - Regulatory Requirements, in particular, n 49-52. 
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shareholders opt-out of regulatory requirements, however. There are no 
obvious candidates to be the "recipients"88 of the "benefits" of the procedural 
requirements. Shareholders are both in theory and in practice "disclosing" 
matters to themselves. 
IV PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The previous section of this paper outlined the issues arising from the 
Companies Act that affect closely-held companies. Given the prevalence of 
closely-held companies in New Zealand, this paper considers that the issues 
raised above are matters that should be addressed. This paper recommends 
adopting a new statute allowing businesses to register as closely-held 
companies. The requirements of such a statute would be tailored towards the 
specific needs of the up to 95 per cent of companies in New Zealand that are 
closely-held. This section of the paper considers some of the general 
principles that may inform the design of such a statute; the next section 
considers some specific features of the new statute. 
A The Need for Specific Legislation 
The first point to be made is the need for specific legislation. The Law 
Commission recommended that a single company law statute be adopted. The 
Commission considered that an appropriately-drafted statute could provide 
sufficient flexibility for every sort of company.89 This paper disagrees with 
the proposition that company law is infinitely "scale-able" in this fashion. 
This paper considers that the needs of widely- and closely-held companies are 
fundamentally different. 
Widely- and closely-held companies are designed to achieve very different 
corporate objectives. Widely-held companies are designed to undertake 
endeavours that are either too expensive or risky for any individual to 
88 For example, Companies Act 1993, s 107(4) requires shareholder agreements under s 107 
to be in writing. It is not necessary to give anyone a copy of this written agreement, however. 
89 Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 16-18, 66-72, 232-241 and 293-
294, and New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform - Supplementary Paper No 2 
- Closely Held Companies - Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, above n 79, para 3(a). 
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undertake him/herself through encouragmg aggregation of capital and 
specialisation of management.9° Closely-held companies, on the other hand, 
provide a mechanism for small business ventures without the same need or 
desire for aggregation of capital or specialisation of management. 
Separation of ownership and management is fundamental for widely-held 
companies, but it has the potential for abuse. 91 There is therefore a need to 
impose regulatory requirements on the directors of such companies.92 Such 
separation of ownership and management, and therefore the need for 
regulatory requirements, does not arise in the case of closely-held companies. 
It is therefore necessary to provide two separate legal frameworks catering to 
the particular requirements of both widely- and closely-held companies. 
While the Companies Act adequately caters for the needs of widely-held 
companies,93 it does not adequately address the situation faced by closely-held 
companies. Specific legislation that caters for the needs of closely-held 
companies is the best solution.94 Such new legislation would be in addition to 
the Companies Act. This paper does not advocate the repeal and replacement 
of the Companies Act, as it caters for the needs of widely-held companies. 
90 This also reflects historical notions as to the nature of "companies". Traditionally, 
companies were only formed for large, risky or otherwise significant undertakings - see, for 
example, Companies Act 1993, long title, para (a), Len Sealy "Perception and Policy in 
Company Law Reform" in A Borrowdale, D Rowe and L Taylor (eds) Company Law 
Writings: A New Zealand Collection , above n 20, 1, 11 , Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law 
of Private Companies" (1995) 16 Comp Law 171, footnote 3, and Adam Smith An !nqui1y 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Edinburgh, 1776) Book V, Chapter I, 
Part III, Article I <http ://www.gutenberg.org> (last accessed 22 August 2006). 
91 See, for example, Robert Flannigan "Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors" 
[2004] JBL 277. Note that for these purposes the classification of directors ' duties as 
fiduciary or nominate is largely irrelevant. See also, for example, the situation of the South 
Sea Company and other "bubble" companies of the 1 gth Century in Charles Mackay 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1852) 
<http://www.gutenberg.org> (last accessed 22 August 2006) or 
<http ://robotics.caltech.edu/- mason/Delusions> (last accessed 27 August 2006). 
92 See, for example, New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: A Discussion Paper 
(NZLC PPS , Wellington, 1987), para 37, and Law Commission Company Law Report, above 
n 1, paras 21 and 85. 
93 Aspects of the Companies Act 1993 may be criticised even for widely-held companies. This 
is beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
94 See, for example, Johan Henning "The Company Law Reform Bill, Small Businesses and 
Private Companies" (2006) 27 Comp Law 97, 97, and David Goddard "Company Law 
Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 31, 163 . 
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B Comparative Precedent 
There is a significant amount of comparative precedent to consider in 
fonnulating a new closely-held companies statute. Internationally, a number 
of jurisdictions have implemented statutes specifically designed for closely-
held/private companies.95 Most relevant for New Zealand are the examples of 
the United States and South Africa. In the United States, Wyoming first 
adopted a Limited Liability Company ("LLC") statute in 1977.96 Since then, 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted LLC statutes,97 and 
the LLC is the fastest-growing business form in the United States.98 This 
popularity is due to a combination of flexibility, limited liability and 
favourable tax treatment.99 The broadly-comparable South African Close 
Corporations Act 100 has met with similar success. 101 These approaches have 
been described as a "hybrid" of company and partnership law. 102 This 
"incorporated partnership" model has been put forward by a number of 
95 Particularly civil jurisdictions. The German Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung or 
"GmbH" is often attributed the status of the "fust" private companies statute. As to the actual 
comparability of United States-style Limited Liability Companies with the German GmbH, 
see Dominik Kallweit The US Limited Liability Company: A Role Model for German 
Company Law (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2003). 
96 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat title 17 chapter 15 (1977). For the 
history of the Limited Liability Company in the United States, see Dominik Kallweit The US 
Limited Liability Company: A Role Model for German Company Law , above n 95 , 4-6, 
Hannah L Thompson ' 'New Business Options in Pennsylvania: A Critical Analysis of the 
Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company and Limited Liability Partnership Act of 1994" 
[1995] University of Pittsburgh Law Review 129, 130-133, Fallany O Stover and Susan Pace 
Hamill "The LLC versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice" 
(1999) 50 Alabama Law Review 813 , 813-821, and Carol J Miller "LLPs: How Limited is 
Limited Liability?" (1997) 53 Journal of the Missouri Bar 154, 154-155. 
97 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), prefatory note, I. 
98 See, for example, Jeffrey K Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability 
Companies: The Need for a Better Standard" (2004) 3 DePaul Business & Commercial Law 
Journal 51 , 63. 
99 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), prefatory note, 1. 
10° Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA) . 
101 See Rehana Cassim and Femida Cassim "The Reform of Corporate Law in South Africa" 
(2005) 16 ICCLR 411, 413 . In particular, the article cites the fact that South Africa has 
approximately 880,000 actively registered close corporations, but only 300,000 private 
companies and 6,000 public companies. 
102 Jeffrey K Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a 
Better Standard", above n 98, 51. 
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commentators recommending changes to company law m jurisdictions 
without such statutes. 103 
The United States and South African statutes have been successful in practice; 
New Zealand should carefully consider whether there are any compelling 
reasons for departing from proven-success. 104 This papers' proposals proceed 
on this basis. While the overall framework and some specific features are 
worth emulating, however, there are a number of changes that could usefully 
be made to this international precedent, particularly with the goal of 
simplification in mind. 105 For example, the United States model is carefully-
structured so as to provide sufficient options to enable LLCs to take advantage 
of the particular tax situation in the United States. 106 This would not be 
necessary in New Zealand, and so some of this complexity could be removed. 
This paper also considers other options for simplification. 
From a domestic perspective it is worthwhile considering the provisions of 
partnership law. 107 Partnerships are effectively closely-held businesses where 
the partners have both equity stakes 108 and management rights 109 in the 
business. Partnerships provide significant advantages in terms of flexibility, 110 
although do lack some of the features of company law, most notably, limited 
liability. 
103 See, for example, Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, 
in particular, 176-177, Johan Henning "The Company Law Reform Bill, Small Businesses 
and Private Companies", above n 94, 97, and David Goddard "Company Law Reforms -
Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 31, 163. 
104 David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31 , 165-166. 
105 David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31 , 165-166. 
106 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) , prefatory note, 1, Hannah L Thompson 
"New Business Options in Pennsylvania: A Critical Analysis of the Pennsylvania Limited 
Liability Company and Limited Liability Partnership Act of 1994", above n 96, 130 and 
footnotes 6-7, Fallany O Stover and Susan Pace Hamill 'The LLC versus LLP Conundrum: 
Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice", above n 96, 815 and footnote 8, and Carol 
J Miller "LLPs: How Limited is Limited Liability?", above n 96, 154 and footnote 7. 
107 See Partnerships Act 1908. 
108 See Partnerships Act 1908, in particulars 27(a). 
109 See Partnerships Act 1908, in particulars 27(e). 
110 See Partnerships Act 1908, s 22. 
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As discussed in the preceding section, this paper argues that the new statute 
should be in addition to the Companies Act. It is therefore also important to 
consider the precedent of the existing Companies Act too. Consistency with 
the existing law where possible would be advantageous: precedent and 
knowledge of existing concepts will make the new statute more readily 
understandable. Perhaps more importantly, the statute should not impose 
substantially more onerous obligations than the existing Companies Act. 
Otherwise, businesses would simply incorporate under the existing statute 
rather than the new closely-held companies statute. 
C Form of the New Legislation 
This paper further recommends that this new legislation be self-contained so 
far as possible. As discussed above, many closely-held companies operate 
informally and without professional advice. 111 It is therefore necessary to state 
the law clearly and concisely to make it as accessible as possible to closely-
h Id · 112 e companies. 
This paper does not consider that the current approach of the Companies Act 
(allowing closely-held companies to opt-out of particular provisions) is 
appropriate. Even if the assorted inconsistencies could be and were 
addressed, 113 such an approach is not as accessible as a self-contained 
statute. 114 Currently, the entire statute must be considered and the applicable 
provisions determined by reference to the dis-applying section. An 
understanding of what one is opting out of is necessary. Further, there are 
many irrelevant provisions. Finally, additional procedural requirements are 
necessary to effect an opt-out. 115 This paper therefore considers that 
111 See above, Part II C 2 - Informality. 
112 See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 121-126, and Rt Hon Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer, President, Law Commission "Law Reform and the Law Commission after 
20 Years - We Need to Try a Little Harder", above n 63, paras 34 and following. 
113 See above, Part III C - Concessions to Closely-Held Companies. 
114 
See also, for example, the comparative table of numbers of sections and pages in selected 
companies statutes in David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New 
Zealand Experience", above n 31, 164. 
115 See also the Companies Bill 2005, no 190 (UK), and Johan Henning "The Company Law 
Reform Bill, Small Businesses and Private Companies" above n 94, 97. 
22 
accessibility would be better achieved either by means of a separate, stand-
alone statute, or by adding a self-contained part to the Companies Act. 
D Flexibility 
The new closely-held compames statute should also provide sufficient 
flexibility to enable principals to conduct their own affairs as they desire. 116 
The general approach to these matters should resemble how a reasonable 
person would run his/her individual affairs. This is the basis on which many 
small businesses currently operate. 117 Moreover, it would provide smaller 
businesses and their stakeholders a realistic and understandable standard of 
conduct. 
Excessive flexibility may, however, compromise the accessibility of the 
statute. 118 The statute should therefore provide suitable "default" provisions 
that would apply unless the principals otherwise agree. 119 This would provide 
guidance and accessibility for basic closely-held companies and their 
principals, while ensuring flexibility for specific purposes or more-advanced 
closely-held companies. Similarly, for certain requirements, it may be 
appropriate to provide general flexibility, but also to set out "safe-harbour" 
provisions. Safe-harbour provisions are useful, as flexible legislation is 
necessarily drafted with a degree of generality. Safe-harbour can provisions 
provide certainty that the law has been satisfied. 
V PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: SPECIFIC FEATURES 
The previous section of this paper discussed the need for a new self-contained 
statute addressing the needs of closely-held companies and some principles 
that may inform its design. This section of the paper considers and 
recommends some specific features of the new statute. In the traditions of the 
11 6 See David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand 
Experience", above n 31 , 162. 
11 7 See above, Part II C 2 - Infonnality. 
11 8 See, for example, Partnerships Act 1908 and its failure to provide a "standard form" 
partnership agreement. 
119 David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31, 167. 
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Law Commission's proposals for company law refonn, 120 the paper also sets 
out possible draft clauses for the new statute. 12 1 
The intent of this section is to set out the most important provisions of the new 
statute. It has not considered some of the technical detailed elements that 
would be necessary for the statute, for example, name 122 and registration 
requirements, 123 service oflegal proceedings 124 and the standard of know ledge 
required to impugn transactions. 125 Finally, and perhaps critical to the success 
of the closely-held companies statute, the paper has not considered matters 
relating to taxation. These matters have not been able to be included within 
the scope of this paper. 
A No "Directors" and "Shareholders" 
The essential feature of a closely-held company is that its shareholders are 
also its directors. 126 Recognising this fact would be the single most important 
element of the new statute. Most importantly, such an approach would clearly 
obviate the need to impose any regulatory requirements on "directors" to 
ensure accountability to "shareholders". 
Rather than having "directors" and "shareholders", this paper instead proposes 
that the new statute refer to "principals" of closely-held companies. This 
encompasses the notion that principals both own and run closely-held 
companies. This approach is utilised in the United States 127 and South 
120 Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 5-7. 
121 The draft clauses are inserted as appropriate throughout the paper. The draft clauses are 
also reproduced in the appendix to this paper. 
122 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 25 , Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 22, 
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-105(a) (1977), and Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 105(a). 
123 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 13-14, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 
12-13, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-106 and 17-15-108 
(1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ss 206 and 208. 
124 
See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 387, and Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 
25 . 
125 
See, for example, Companies Act 1993 , s 19, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 17, and 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 102. 
126 See above, Part II - Empirical Information. 
127 
See, for example, the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-106, 
17-15-107, and 17-15-113 - 17-15-116 (1977), and the U nifom1 Limited Liability Company 
Act (1996), Article 4. Note, however, that these statutes also provide the option for LLCs to 
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Africa, 128 both of which refer to "members" to encompass this concept. This 
paper uses "principals" to denote this member/shareholder/director concept. 
Ultimately, it would be possible to duplicate the existing Companies Act, 
amend the references to "directors" and "shareholders" to read "principals", 
and strip out all the regulatory requirements intended for the benefit of 
shareholders. This would be a significant improvement on the status quo. It 
seems, however, that further improvements can also be made to cater to the 
needs of closely-held companies. 
B Definition and Eligibility 
The prospect of distinguishing a closely-held company from an ordinary 
company caused the Law Commission some concem. 129 This paper proposes, 
however, that the new closely-held companies statute be in addition to the 
Companies Act. Under this paper's approach, there is no need have a ''bright-
line" test to distinguish between the two sorts of companies. Whether to 
incorporate under the Companies Act or under the new closely-held 
companies statute would simply be a decision of the individual(s) concerned. 
There does, however, need to be some eligibility criteria for closely-held 
companies. The proposed closely-held companies statute has been designed 
on the basis that all principals of a closely-held company would be involved in 
its management. This is not practicable where there are too many 
principals. 130 South Africa has a limit of ten principals; 131 this paper proposes 
the same number. It is acknowledged, however, that this is something of an 
arbitrary figure. In any event, however, the vast majority of businesses 
have "managers" if they chose to do so (see Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo 
Stat § 17-15-116 (1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 404). This 
flexibility is primarily due to the United States tax provisions - see Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act ( 1996), prefatory note, 1. 
128 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s !(!), definition of"member" and Part IV. 
129 New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform - Supplementa,y Paper No 2 -
Closely Held Companies - Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, above n 79, para 3(b). 
130 See also above, Part II B - Number of Closely-Held Companies, in particular, n 24. 
131 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 2(1) and 28. 
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wishing to utilise a closely-held company structure will fall below this 
threshold. 132 
This paper also proposes that only natural persons be able to be principals. 
The same approach is adopted in South Africa. 133 The intent of the statute is to 
address the issues associated with the Companies Act for closely-held 
companies. The needs of, and appropriate requirements for, subsidiaries of 
other companies are different to those of small owner-operated businesses. 
Such needs and requirements are outside the scope of this paper. A particular 
concern is the fact that principals exercise management power directly; 
another company is not able to do this under current New Zealand law. 134 It is 
also worth noting that other legal avenues are available for matters such as 
venture capital investment. 135 The new statute may therefore provide, for 
example: 
Draft Clause: Eligibility for Membership of a Closely-Held 
Company 
A Closely-Held Company must have at least one, but not more than 
ten, Principals, all of whom must be natural persons. 
C Creditors, Limited Liability and Regulatory Requirements 
This paper criticises the regulatory requirements of the Companies Act for 
closely-held companies. The situation is quite different, however, for creditors 
and other contractual third-parties ( collectively, "creditors"). 
132 See above, Part II B - Number of Closely-Held Companies. 
133 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 29. 
134 The Companies Act 1993 requires directors to be natural persons - see Companies Act 
1993, s 151(1). 
135 Limited partnerships in particular are apparently the preferred vehicle for the venture 
capital industry. New Zealand's limited partnership regime is currently under review - see 
Ministry of Economic Development A Limited Partnership Regime for New Zealand 
(Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2005) in particular, para 5 
<http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 18 August 2006). There does not seem to be any 
reason why a closely-held company could not be the general partner in a limited partnership . 
This would allow equity investment in the business venture operated by the closely-held 
company while avoiding the difficulties described in this paragraph. 
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Unlike director/shareholder interests, there is no synonymity of interests with 
creditors in the case of a closely-held company. 136 Self-interest cannot be 
relied upon to prevent abuse. Limited liability means that creditors may not be 
able to practically recover against a debtor-company due to its impecuniosity, 
even where the company is clearly liable to the creditor. It is therefore 
necessary to impose some form of regulatory requirement to prevent abuse of 
the corporate form to the detriment of creditors. The costs of such 
requirements will be justified, so long as greater benefit flows to creditors. 
There are a number of possible alternatives for such regulatory requirements. 
This section considers and rejects both the possibilities of removing limited 
liability, and imposing minimum capital requirements. Rather, the paper 
proposes imposing duties for the benefit of creditors. It also considers the 
form and standard of such duties, as well as some practical considerations. 
1 No limited liability 
Limited liability is typically considered as a key feature of company law. It 
encourages entrepreneurship and taking business risks without fear of 
recourse to the other assets of the shareholders. 137 It is not, however, 
universally acclaimed. Objections have been raised both as a matter of 
principle138 and practice. 139 At least one commentator has proposed a closely-
held business statute without limited liability. 140 The essential rationales for 
this are that the majority of closely-held businesses do not want or need 
136 Although it is possible for the principal of a company/closely-held company to lend the 
company money. The principal would be the creditor of his/her own company. The 
synonymity of interests would mean that there is no need for regulatory requirements to 
ensure accountability or prevent abuse. This is likely to be the minority of cases, however. 
137 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, long title, para (a), Rainham Ch emical Works Ltd 
v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921) 2 AC 465, 475 (HL), Lord Buckmaster, New Zealand 
Law Commission Company Law: A Discussion Paper, above n 92, paras 33 and 41 , and Law 
Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, para 22(d). 
138 See, for example, John Farrar "Frankenstein Incorporated or Fools ' Parliament? Revisting 
the Concept of Corporation in Corporate Governance" in A Borrowdale, D Rowe and L 
Taylor (eds) Company Law Writings: A New Zealand Collection, above n 20, 59. 
139 Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, in particular, 174 
and following. 
140 Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, in particular, 176-
177. The author also identifies some existing problems with partnership law that should be 
addressed - see 175-176. 
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limited liability, 141 and may abuse limited liability. 142 Removing limited 
liability would also remove the potential for abuse of the company form. 
There would therefore be no need to impose regulatory requirements to 
counter this potential for abuse. The argument is that closely-held businesses 
would get greater benefits from the removal of limited liability than its 
retention. 143 
This ignores, however, the fact that it is possible to limit liability in other 
ways. It will, of course, be possible to limit liability by incorporating a 
company under the Companies Act rather than a closely-held company. It is 
also possible to limit liability contractually by including express tenns to that 
effect with third-parties. 144 Contractual limitation or disclaimer of liability 
may even include some claims sounding in tort. 145 Moreover, regardless of 
one's normative views as to the appropriateness of limited liability, it must be 
accepted that limited liability is now a feature of the commercial environment. 
Limited liability does not appear to have been seriously challenged in any 
141 Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, 175-176. In 
summary, statistical information tends to indicate that the majority of businesses are not 
incorporated, and of those that are, limited liability is undermined through the use of personal 
guarantees (note that this is a United Kingdom article and cites United Kingdom empirical 
sources). The latter finding, at least, accords with the empirical findings presented in this 
paper - see above, Part II C 1 - Synonymity. 
142 Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, 174-175. The 
author's primary concern is under-capitalisation to the detriment of creditors and the relative 
paucity of sanctions against delinquent company directors. 
143 Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, 176-177. 
144 If the bargaining position is such that third-parties will not agree to such terms (for 
example, banks), then it is likely that limitation of liability through incorporating a company 
would not be acceptable either, and a personal guarantee would be required by those third-
parties. As to the "standard form contract" model for company law, see, for example, New 
Zealand Law Commission Company Law: A Discussion Paper, above n 92, para 36, and 
David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31 , 146. One intriguing possibility flowing from this standard forn1 contract model is 
the prospect of providing for a Closely-Held Companies "Act" not as an Act of Parliament, 
but rather through common adoption of contractual terms - for example, making the "Act" 
publicly available, and allowing those that wish to "incorporate" under it to reference the 
terms of the "Act" contractually. 
145 
See, for example, Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL), 
where the plaintiffs would have been successful in an action for negligent misstatement, but 
for the defendant's disclaimer of liability. It is also possible to implement a form of asset 
protection through family trusts and property relationship agreements. Asset protection is not 
the same as limited liability, however; personal bankruptcy is a necessary precursor for asset 
protection to be necessary. This is discussed further below - see below, Part V C 7 - Asset 
protection. 
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major review of company law. 146 South Africa147 and the United States 148 both 
provide for limited liability for their closely-held companies. Indeed, the trend 
seems to be to increase the scope of limited liability protections. 149 Finally, 
rejecting limited liability would be open to criticism on the basis that a 
nominally-enabling and facilitative statute does not adequately cater for the 
New Zealand business environment. 150 
Realistically, if a new closely-held companies statute were adopted without 
limited liability, parties that desire limited liability will either adopt 
contractual terms or incorporate under the Companies Act. The former will 
result in transactional inefficiency, while the latter will simply render the new 
statute redundant. It therefore seems appropriate that the new closely-held 
companies statute make provision for limitation of liability: 
Draft Clause: Limited Liability 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company are not liable for the 
debts of the Closely-Held Company. 151 
2 Minimum capital requirements 
Maintaining limited liability means that it is necessary to resort to other 
avenues to ensure the corporate form does not lead to abuse of creditors. 
Minimum capital requirements are a traditional feature of company law. 152
 
Such requirements theoretically prevent the formation of, or trading by, 
companies that run the risk of failure due to undercapitalisation. Set at an 
appropriate level, minimum capital requirements may also discourage "over-
incorporation" - that is, companies that are incorporated for a single, short 
146 See, for example, Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, the Department of 
Trade and Industry Better Business Fram ework: Companies Bill (Department of Trade and 
Industry, London) http://www.dti .gov. uk (last accessed 6 September 2006). 
147 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 2(3). 
148 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-113 
(1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ss 201 and 303. 
149 For example, allowing law firms to incorporate - see Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 
2006, s 6 definition of"incorporated law firm" and Part 2. 
150 This is the same criticism levelled at the Companies Act 1993 by this paper. 
151 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 15, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 2(3), 
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-113 (1977), and Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ss 201 and 303. 
152 For example, stated and par value shares. This does not include the solvency test. 
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business venture that are wound up immediately following the completion of 
the venture (with the inherent risks to creditors). This limits incorporation to 
"serious" business ventures of a certain size. 
Such requirements have significant problems, however, and were abolished in 
New Zealand in the current Companies Act. This paper considers that 
problems identified by the Law Commission with such requirements are 
compelling, and minimum capital requirements should not be introduced. 
153 
Even if the Law Commission's reasons were not so compelling, the likely 
imposition of minimum capital requirements could not be required in isolation 
only for closely-held companies. Businesses would again simply chose to 
incorporate under the Companies Act instead. 
While New Zealand arguably allows incorporation too easily,
154 
this is a 
matter that would need to be addressed across company law, not just in the 
context of closely-held companies. Limiting companies to serious business 
ventures of a certain size would, however, simply create greater risks and 
barriers to entry for the smallest businesses, those that are most likely to take 
advantage of a closely-held companies statute. This paper therefore does not 
consider such a proposal would be appropriate for a new closely-held 
companies statute for New Zealand. 
3 Duties to creditors 
Having rejected the abolition of limited liability and the introduction of 
minimum capital requirements, it is necessary to consider other means of 
ensuring creditors' interests are upheld. The Companies Act, which also has 
limited liability and no minimum capital requirements, attempts to do this by 
means of imposing directors' duties in favour of creditors.
155 This recognises 
that although the principal(s) of a closely-held company may be liable to 
153 See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 84 and 223-228. 
154 See above, n 21. 
155 Note that some duties are owed to the company, and some are owed to creditors directly. 
This is considered below - see below, Part V C 4 - Balancing mechanisms versus direct 
regulatory requirements. 
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creditors for damages, even though the principal(s) are not liable for the debts 
of the closely-held company directly. 
The Companies Act imposes a number of different duties in favour of 
creditors. First, the Companies Act imposes a duty on directors not to trade 
"recklessly" - that is, a director must not agree, cause or allow the business of 
a company to be carried on in a manner "likely to create a substantial risk of 
serious loss to the company's creditors". 156 Second, there is a duty not to enter 
into obligations that cannot be performed. 157 Third, there is a duty to keep 
accounting records. 158 Fourth, in specific relation to payments to principals, 
there are two further different duties/tests - payments to a principal as a 
director must effectively be reasonable, 159 while payments to a principal as a 
shareholder must satisfy the solvency test. 16° Finally, the Companies Act 
includes something of a catch-all duty on directors ( and certain others) not to 
act negligently or otherwise breach any duty or trust. 161 Related to this catch-
all duty, there is also a common law duty to creditors not to cause loss, at the 
least in the case of insolvency or potential-insolvency of a company. 162 
The United States and South Africa similarly impose duties on principals of 
closely-held companies in favour of creditors. The United States approach 
varies between jurisdictions. The more robust view as to limitation of liability 
only holds a principal liable in a limited range of circumstances: a principal is 
156 Companies Act 1993, s 135. 
157 Companies Act 1993, s 136. 
158 Companies Act 1993, ss 194 and 300. 
159 Companies Act 1993, ss 161(4) and 161(5). 
16° Companies Act 1993, ss 4, 52, 53 , 107 and 108. As to directors ' liability, see Companies 
Act 1993, s 52(2), 56(2) and 108(2), as well as s 134. Note that the recipient of the payment 
may also be liable for any distributions received that the recipient knew were in contravention 
of the solvency test (see Companies Act 1993, ss 56(1) and 108(4)). For a closely-held 
company, such differentiation of liability is not particularly useful. 
161 Companies Act 1993, s 30 I . Note that this is phrased as a discretionary remedy, rather than 
a duty. 
162 Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd, [1985] 1 NZLR 242, 249-250 (CA) Cooke J. See also 
West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250; [1988] BCC 30 (EWCA), 
Morrison 's Company Law (NZ) , above n 80, paras 24.8, L S Sealy "Directors ' 'Wider' 
Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural", above n 43 , 178-179, 
Francis Dawson "Acting in the Best Interests of the Company - For Whom are Directors 
'Trustees'?" (1984) 11 NZULR 68, 68-70, and Cooney Report, above n 43 , paras 5.1 and 
following. 
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liable for company property and money; 
163 for capital he/she has agreed to, 
but has not yet, contributed; 
164 and for distributions received in breach of the 
solvency test. 165 The slightly less robust view adopts generally the same 
approach, 166 but with the addition of a general duty not to engage in knowing 
violations of the law, intentional misconduct, reckless conduct, or grossly 
negligent conduct. 167 That is, a principal has a general duty of care to the 
standard of gross negligence not to cause loss. It is, however, important to 
note that this apparently robust approach is countered by the well-established 
United States "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine. Under this doctrine, it is 
possible to set aside limited liability protections in a range of circumstances, 
including fraud, undercapitalisation, the "alter ego" doctrine, and, in some 
circumstances, failure to observe the formalities of the corporate form.
168 
The South African approach is again broadly similar. Principals are liable for 
promised contributions
169 and distributions made in breach of the solvency 
test. 170 Like the less robust approach in the United States, South Africa also 
has general duty of care provisions. Unlike the United States, South Africa's 
163 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-121(b) 
(1977). 
164 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-121(a) 
(1977). 
165 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-119 and 
17-15-120 ( 1977). The solvency test used in the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act is 
a simple test of assets exceeding liabilities - see Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 
Wyo Stat § 17-15-119 (1977). 
166 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ss 409(b)(l) (company 
property), 402 (liability for contributions) and 406-407 (distributions in breach of the 
solvency test). The solvency test used in the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act is a 
two-stage test of assets exceeding liabilities and ability to pay debts in the ordinary course of 
business - see Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 406(a). 
167 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) , s 409(c). See also 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 303, comment. 
168 See generally, Jeffrey K Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: 
The Need for a Better Standard", above n 98, 58-63 . Note that failure to observe formalities 
has generally been questioned as a factor (see Jeffrey K Vandervoort "Piercing the Veil of 
Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a Better Standard", above n 98, 59-61), and in 
some cases, statutorily abolished - see, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), s 303(b). 
169 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 24(5) and 63(b). 
17° Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 51. South African adopts a broader meaning of 
distribution (any payment to a principal by reason only of his/her status as principal - that is, 
excluding only contracts for services) and a three part solvency test (balance sheet, ability to 
pay debts as they become due, and whether in fact the distribution will mean debts will not be 
able to be paid - see Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 51 (1 )). 
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statute provides for two standards of care: both ordinary negligence, 17 1 and 
gross negligence. 172 Additionally, South Africa requires accounting records to 
be kept, although the direct penalty for breach is criminal, rather than civil. 173 
The approaches of the United States and South Africa, although somewhat 
simpler than New Zealand, are still complicated. Much of this complexity is 
due to the fact that company law seldom imposes direct regulatory 
requirements. Rather, most regulatory requirements are owed to "the 
company" in a type of balancing mechanism. 
4 Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements 
As discussed in this paper, company law imposes a number of regulatory 
requirements. While some regulatory requirements on directors are owed to 
shareholders directly, 174 the majority of duties, both in New Zealand 175 and 
overseas 176 , are owed to "the company" as part of the balancing mechanism to 
resolve competing interests. 
In a company (particularly a widely-held company), there may be a number of 
competing interest groups, including directors, shareholders and creditors, and 
potentially subgroups of shareholders and creditors ("stakeholders"). There 
may be tensions between the interests of such stakeholders - for example, a 
shareholder' s interest in the company maximising its dividends may be 
opposed to creditor's interests in the company maintaining sufficient assets to 
pay its debts. 
Company law therefore attempts to provide a mechanism to resolve the 
competing interests of the assorted stakeholders in a company. Rather than 
owing separate and potentially conflicting duties to ensure the various groups 
of stakeholders ' interests are maintained, the majority of directors' duties are 
171 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43. 
172 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 64. 
173 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 56. 
174 For New Zealand, see especially Companies Act 1993 , s 169(3). 
175 See especially Companies Act 1993, s 169(3). 
176 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43, and Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (1996), s 409(c). 
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instead owed to the company. The primary duty is to act in the best interests 
of the company. 177 This mechanism effectively allows certain interests to 
trump other interests. So in the shareholder/creditor interests example above, 
it is in the interests of the company not to become insolvent, therefore it is not 
in the interests of the company to distribute all cash received to the 
shareholders as quickly as possible. 
Taking the example of a one-person closely-held company, 178 however, it is 
clear that there are no competing interests to "balance". The only major group 
of stakeholders in a one-person closely-held company would be its creditors. 
Following this reasoning to its conclusion, there is no need to impose on the 
principal a duty to creditors via "the company" at all. Instead, it would be 
possible to simply impose a direct duty on the principal of a one-person 
company in favour of creditors. This is similar to the current c01mnon law 
approach in New Zealand as expressed in Nicholson v Permakraft. 179 
This would have the advantage of simplicity. The complexities and vagaries 
of the balancing exercise have been criticised. 180 This approach would also 
avoid situations where wrongdoers indirectly benefit from actions taken 
against them. For example, the situation where a director has breached a duty 
to a company and the company successfully sues him/her for that breach. If, 
however, the director were also a shareholder in that company, he/she would 
indirectly benefit anyway due to the increase in value of his/her shares. 
177 Companies Act 1993, s 131. See also Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, 
paras 184-196 and 504-509, and clause 101. In summary, the Law Commission recommended 
that a duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company be the "fundamental" duty 
of directors, effectively trumping other directors' duties by its place at the top of the proposed 
"hierarchy" of duties. Note, however, that the Companies Act 1993 was not enacted in this 
form following the redrafting of the then-Companies Bill by the Department of Justice and the 
Commerce Select Committee - see Companies Act 1993, s 131, David Goddard "Company 
Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 31 , 156, Jenni 
McManus "Law Commission v Justice Department - Squabbling Officials Stall Company 
Law Reform", above n 82, and Bob Dey "Company Law - the Slow Job of Reform" above n 
82. 
178 
Considering a one-person company also forces greater focus on the specific considerations 
of the corporate form, without the diversions associated with multiple shareholders. The 
position of multiple shareholders is considered below - see below, Part V D - Multi-Principal 
Closely-Held Companies. 
179 Above n 162. 
180 See, in particular, L S Sealy "Directors' 'Wider' Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, 
Practical and Procedural", above n 43, 175. 
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Further, it would obviate the need for more-complicated enforcement 
mechanisms such as a derivative actions. 181 Such mechanisms are arguably 
disadvantageous for shareholders, 182 as they must effectively satisfy the court 
twice of the appropriateness of the action. 183 
Further, this approach would avoid the need for particular provisions relating 
to shareholder ratification. Ratification allows shareholders to "cure" 
defalcations by directors in something akin to an "after-the-breach" form of 
the concessions to closely-held companies provided in the Companies Act. 184 
Such ratification could also have consequences for creditors of the company, 
however. Ratification could mean that money owed to the company by its 
directors does not have to be paid, even if that money would otherwise be 
available to a company to pay its creditors. This is a particular problem for 
closely-held companies. In the case of a one-person company, it would be a 
simple matter to ratify all breaches. 
New Zealand law therefore recognises that, in certain circumstances, 
ratification would amount to a fraud on creditors and imposes liability on the 
ratifying party. 185 This has been statutorily recognised in other jurisdictions, 
whereby ratification is not effective as against creditors. 186 This is again, 
however, a rather convoluted process of ensuring creditors' interests are 
upheld. Imposing duties on the principal of a closely-held company directly in 
respect of creditors would resolve this issue by removing even the possibility 
of ratification. 
181 See Companies Act 1993, Part IX, and in particulars ss 165 and 169. See also Law 
Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, para 318. 
182 Although there are costs advantages - see Companies Act 1993, s 166. 
183 Leave of the Court is required to bring a derivative action - see Companies Act 1993, s 
165, and Vrij v Boyle [1995] 3 NZLR 763 (HC). See also Securities Markets Act 1988, s 18, 
and Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Wilson Neill Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 152 (CA). 
184 See above, Part III C - Concessions to Closely-Held Companies, and Morrison 's Company 
Law (NZ), above n 80, paras 25.42-25.44. See also the ratification provisions in the South 
African and United States closely-held company statutes - Close Corporations Act 1984 
(ZA), s 43(2), Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-121(c) (1977), 
and Unifonn Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 103(b)(2)(ii). 
185 See McCullagh v Gellert, above n 36. 
186 For example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-12 l(c) (1977). 
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5 Standard of care 
As discussed in the preceding two sections, this paper recommends imposing 
a duty of care on the principals of a closely-held company in respect of the 
company's creditors. The appropriate standard of care for that duty must be 
considered. Imposing liability too readily will discourage what may be 
justifiable business risks because of fear of individual liability; making it too 
difficult to hold delinquent principals liable will not uphold creditors' 
interests. 
There are a number of possibilities for such a standard. New Zealand, 187 the 
United States188 and South Africa189 all currently provide for a solvency test 
for some matters. This is effectively a "strict" standard, in that it is either 
satisfied in the particular circumstances or it is not. Both the United States 190 
and South Africa19 1 uses a gross negligence test for some matters; South 
Africa also uses ordinary negligence in some circumstances. 192 New Zealand 
has an array of tests, 193 the standard of which is not always clear. 194 
Into this already-confusing mix must be added the common law "business 
judgment rule". This rule reflects the courts' traditional reluctance to become 
involved in matters of "business judgment" and to not second guess paiiicular 
187 Companies Act 1993, s 4. 
188 For example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-119 and 17-
15-120 (1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ss 406-407. See also 
above, n 165 and n 166. 
189 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), 51(1 ). See also above, n 170. 
190 For example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 490(c). See also above, n 
168. 
191 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 64. See also above, n 172. 
192 Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 43. See also above, n 171. 
193 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 131-138 and 300-301 , and Nicholson v 
Permalcraft (NZ) Ltd, above n 162. 
194 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 135 . Notwithstanding the title of the section 
being "reckless" trading, the section itself refers to "likely to create a substantial risk of 
serious loss" [emphasis addedJ. See also Re Global Print Strategies Ltd (In Liquidation) (aft 
cit Mason v Lewis) (25 November 2004) HC AK M459-IM03 , para 38, Salmon J (note that 
while this case was reversed on appeal, the observations ons 135 were not challenged - see 
Mason v Lewis, above n 29), and Fatupaito v Bates [2001] 3 NZLR 386; (2001) 9 NZCLC 
262,583 , paras 60-67 (HC) O'Regan J. Goddard goes further and describes some of the duties 
(Companies Act 1993, ss 135 and 136) as "extraordinary" - see David Goddard "Company 
Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", above n 31, 159 and footnote 
35. 
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decisions of directors. 195 It is effectively a presumption of non-liability where 
the transaction is not self-interested, is undertaken on an informed basis, and 
is not irrational. 196 A form of the business judgment rule is recognised in the 
Companies Act, 197 although it does not appear to have been interpreted as 
such. 198 
Out of this multitude, one common theme is perhaps that greater scrutiny 
needs to be paid to self interested transactions. Other than this, it is difficult to 
determine any general trends or any particular standard of international best 
practice. While it is clearly necessary to strike an adequate balance between 
protecting creditors' interests and not unduly fettering business discretion, 
there will always be some dispute about whether the correct balance has been 
stuck. 
195 See, for example, Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co [1925] Ch 407 (CA). 
196 See Corporations Act 2001 (Aus), s 180(2), and Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A 2d 805, 
812 (Supreme Court of Delaware) Moore J for the Court (note that Brehm v Eisner (2000) 
746 A 2d 244 (Supreme Court of Delaware en bane), overrules the case in part, and Kamen v 
Kemper Financial Services, Inc (1990) 908 F 2d 1338 (7 th Circuit Court of Appeals), rejects 
in part, but neither is relevant to the business judgment rule itself). See also L S Sealy 
"Reforming the Law on Directors' Duties" (1991) 12 Comp Law 175, 177, Len Sealy 
"Directors' Duties Revisited" (2001) 22 Comp Law 79, 79, R Baxt "Can the Law Relating to 
Directors' Duties be Reformed?", above n 43, 111-112, R Baxt "Proposals for Reforming 
Company Law - The Duties of Directors" (1992) 10 Company and Securities Law Journal 
139, 139-140, Karen O'Flynn "Australia: Corporate - Directors' Duties" (2005) 11 
International Trade Law & Regulation N37, N38-N39, Demetra Arsalidou "Objectivity vs 
Flexibility in Civil Law Jurisdictions and the Possible Introduction of the Business Judgment 
Rule in English Law" (2003) 24 Comp Law 228, 228 and 230-233, Demetra Arsalidou "An 
Examination into the Recent Approach of the Courts in Articulating a Standard of Care for 
Company Chairpersons in Australia" (2005) 26 Comp Law 155, 156, Mohammed B Hernraj 
"Company Directors: the Defence of Business Judgement Rule" (2003) 24 Comp Law 218, 
218-219, Mohammed B Hernraj "The Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Law" (2004) 15 
ICCLR 192, 192-194, David Tan "Delivering the Judgment on a Statutory Business Judgment 
Rule in Australia" 1995 AJCL LEXIS 39, in particular, 4-12 and 17-24, Robert Flannigan 
"Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors" [2004] JBL 277, 289-290, Cooney Report, 
above n 43, paras 3.30-3.35, and England and Wales Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a 
Statement of Duties, above n 51, paras 5.21-5 .25. 
197 See Companies Act 1993, s 138, and Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, 
paras 520-522 and clause 107. 
198 Compare, for example, the Court of Appeal judgment in Mason v Lewis, above n 29, in 
particular paras 77-83, Judgment of the Court, with the High Court judgment in the same case 
(Re Global Print Strategies Ltd (In Liquidation), above n 194), in particular paras 41-42 and 
67-68, Salmon J. 
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6 Proposed duty of care 
With the factors considered in the previous sections in mind, as well as the 
general principle of flexibility, 199 this paper proposes a general duty not to 
conduct the business of a closely-held company in such a way that causes loss 
to creditors. This duty would be imposed on principals directly in favour of 
creditors, without resort to "the company", as is outlined in Nicholson v 
Permakrajt. 200 That case phrased the duty as only arising in the event of 
insolvency, however. 201 It seems that this could be approached more simply as 
a duty to refrain from prejudicing the interests of creditors generally. This is 
effectively a duty not to become insolvent. This paper therefore recommends 
that the new closely-held companies statute provide that: 
Draft Clause: Duties of Principals to Creditors 
(1) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company must not 
conduct the business of the Closely-Held Company in such a 
way that causes loss to creditors of the Closely-Held 
Company. 
This clearly favours creditors too much. It is therefore necessary to introduce 
a range of exceptions/defences for principals. Broadly, this paper recommends 
that there should be two standards of care: one for non-interested transactions 
and one for self-interested transactions. Self-interested transactions require 
much greater scrutiny and therefore a higher standard of care. This paper 
therefore recommends that the new statute provide: 
(2) A Principal that breaches the duty in subsection (1) is liable 
to creditor(s) that suffer loss due to the breach, unless: 
(a) The Principal, in causing the Closely-Held Company 
to undertake the actions that are alleged to have 
cause the breach: 202 
(i) Did not have a personal interest in the 
actions, or the outcome of the actions; 
(ii) Acted in an informed manner; and 
199 See above, Part IV D - Flexibility. 
200 Above n 162. 
20 1 Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd, above n 162, 249-250 Cooke J. 
202 See, for example, Corporations Act 2001 (Aus), s 180(2). 
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(iii) Had a rational belief that the actions would 
not cause loss to creditors; or 
(b) The actions that are alleged to have caused the 
breach would have been undertaken by a 
reasonably prudent business person acting as a 
Principal of the Closely-Held Company. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(iii) , a belief is rational 
unless it is a belief such that no reasonable person in the 
position of the Principal could hold it. 203 
This approach would utilise a version of the business judgment rule for non-
interested transactions. So long as a principal is not interested in the 
transaction, and makes the decision on an informed and rational basis, it is not 
open to challenge. This should empower principals with sufficient security 
from liability to encourage business decisions. 
This paper proposes a reasonableness standard for self-interested transactions. 
This effectively extends the current New Zealand position for non-distribution 
payments to principals204 to all self-interested transactions, including 
dividends. This is more flexible than the traditional solvency test. The use of a 
"reasonably prudent business person acting as a principal of the closely-held 
company" acknowledges that the nature of business undertaken by closely-
held companies will vary from company to company. 205 
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with business 
decisions or formulate a "reasonable businessman" standard of care.206 In 
practice, however, such a standard has been developing in relation to 
prohibitions of delinquent directors.207 There does not seem to be any reason 
203 See, for example, Corporations Act 2001 (Aus) , s 180(2). This is akin to a public 
law!Wednesbury reasonableness test - see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbwy Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (EWCA). 
204 Companies Act 1993, s 161. 
205 See also above, Part IV D - Flexibility. 
206 See, for example, Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co , above n 195. 
207 See Companies Act 1993, s 385, National Enforcement Unit Banned Directors and 
Managers I Director Prohibitions (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2006) 
<http://www.enforcement.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 6 September 2006), Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (UK), Insolvency Service (United Kingdom) Director 
Disqualification & Restrictions (Insolvency Service, London, 2006) 
<http ://insolvency.gov.uk> (last accessed 23 September 2006), and Len Sealy "Directors 
Duties in the New Millennium" (2000) 21 Comp Law 64, 64, and Len Sealy "Directors' 
Duties Revisited", above n 196, 79-80. 
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why such a standard should not extend to liability as well as potential 
prohibition. Punishment through prohibition is likely to be of little comfort to 
out-of-pocket creditors. Reasonableness (in varying forms) is also used by 
South Africa and the United States.208 
Out of concern that reasonableness may be uncertain for some risk-averse 
principals, it may be appropriate to introduce a safe-harbour provision for 
self-interested transactions: 
( 4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b ), the actions that are 
alleged to have caused the breach shall be deemed to be 
reasonable if, at the time the actions are undertaken :209 
(a) The Closely-Held Company is able to pay its debts 
as they become due in the normal course of 
business; and 
{b) The value of the Closely-Held Company's assets is 
greater than the value of its liabilities, including 
contingent liabilities. 
This approach would deem any transaction that satisfied a solvency test to be 
reasonable. Principals that were willing to undertake the necessary steps to 
determine whether the solvency test is satisfied (probably by taking 
accounting advice) would be safe from liability to creditors. This would be an 
optional safe-harbour. 
7 Asset protection 
As discussed, separate legal personality and limited liability are not 
universally acclaimed.210 Much of the criticism focuses on the potential 
injustice resulting from abuse of the corporate form. Assets can be placed 
208 See above, Part V C 3 - Duties to creditors, and Part V C 5 - Standard of care 
209 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, s 4, and Law Commission Company Law Report, 
above n 1, paras 330-333 and clause 3(3) (note that the Law Commission's formulation is 
preferred as it provides greater flexibility). See also, for example, Close Corporations Act 
1984 (ZA), 51, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-119 (1977), and 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 406(a). 
2 10 See above, Part V C 1 - No limited liability. 
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beyond the reach of rightful creditors. 2 11 There are, however, two points to be 
made in this regard. 
Asset protection is not a problem of limited liability companies. Assets can be 
protected through a number of legal mechanisms, including trusts2 12 and 
relationship property agreements,21 3 as well as through companies. Moreover, 
it should also be noted that while a company may incur debts without recourse 
to the assets of the principals, equally principals may incur debts without 
recourse to the assets of the company. 
The issue of asset protection is therefore not limited to company law. It is 
unfair to criticise company law exclusively, when in fact, greater problems 
arise from combining the assorted asset protection mechanisms. If this is an 
issue that does need to be resolved, it is more appropriate to do so through 
general mechanisms of property law, rather than through company law.2 14 
8 Practical considerations: enforcement 
The temptation to impose ever-increasing regulatory requirements has been 
attributed to the fear of potential abuse of the corporate form. 2 15 This paper 
has proposed a relatively minimalist set of regulatory requirements. If there is 
concern regarding the potential for abuse of the corporate form, this paper 
considers that greater emphasis should be placed on enforcing the existing 
regulatory requirements, rather than applying additional regulatory 
requirements across all businesses. 
2 11 See, for example, Andrew Hicks "Reforming the Law of Private Companies", above n 90, 
174-175. The author's primary concern is under-capitalisation to the detriment of creditors. 
2 12 See, for example, Official Assignee v Wilson [2006] 2 NZLR 841 (HC). 
213 See, for example, Felton v Johnson [2006] NZSC 31 (SC). 
214 In this regard, this paper notes that the Government has announced its intentions to revise 
the Property Law Act 1952 in accordance with the recommendations of the Law Commission. 
The Law Commission does not, however, recommend substantial changes to the current 
provisions relating to the disposition of property to the prejudice of creditors - see New 
Zealand Law Commission A New Property Law Act (NZLC R29, Wellington, 1994), and Law 
Commission Media Release "Palmer welcomes legislation implementing reports" (8 
September 2006) Press Release <http ://www.scoop.co.nz> (last accessed 16 September 
2006). Also compare Property Law Act 1952, s 60 and New Zealand Law Commission A New 
Property Law Act, paras 51-52 and draft Bill, Part 5, Subpart 2 (cls 63-69). 
2 15 David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
aboven31, 164. 
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Enforcement of duties to creditors is a particular issue. Creditors may be 
reluctant to pursue actions against delinquent principals due to the time and 
cost involved. In particular, creditors are likely to be reluctant to "throw good 
money after bad" pursuing principals. This may be compounded if principals 
have adopted some of the asset protection mechanisms described in the 
preceding section. 
One method of improving enforcement is through mandatory liability 
insurance for principals. Principals could be required to insure against liability 
to creditors under the duties proposed above. This would ensure that creditors 
would be able to recover, even if principals have employed some measure of 
asset protection. Moreover, it could lower the costs of enforcement. If it was 
more economical for insurers to pay out valid claims, court action would not 
be necessary. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if insurance was 
mandatory for all principals, then principals with a history of dereliction of 
duty to creditors would either pay much higher premiums or perhaps even be 
entirely uninsurable. The market would itself reduce the incidence of 
delinquent principals. 
Such a proposal would clearly be contingent on the availability of such 
insurance. In drafting this paper, a number of insurers offering "director and 
officer" insurance were contacted directly. While such insurance does exist 
for smaller companies, it is tailored more towards larger companies. 
Moreover, several of the msurers only provide msurance to 
directors/officers/principals with an established history of compliance with 
legal obligations. At least one other insurer's coverage for non-established 
principals excludes claims if the company becomes insolvent.216 New 
principals may therefore find it difficult to arrange the required insurance. 
Introducing a mandatory insurance requirements may create barriers for 
people to establish new closely-held companies. 
216 Interview with B, anonymous insurer (the author, by telephone, 28 July 2006), 
correspondence with C, anonymous insurer (the author, by email, 19 July 2006), 
correspondence with D, anonymous insurer (the author, by email, 19 July 2006), and 
correspondence with Insurance Council (the author, by email, 18 July 2006). As the 
information provided could be commercially sensitive, an undertaking not to disclose the 
detailed information was provided. 
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If the insurers were not willing or able to establish the requisite insurance 
market, an alternative would be establishing an "assetless company fund", as 
was recommended by the Law Commission,21 7 or increasing the scope of the 
existing Liquidation Surplus Account.2 18 This would effectively provide a 
legal aid fund to assist creditors in pursuing claims against delinquent 
principals. This would ensure that delinquent principals could be held to 
account, even where it may not otherwise be economically-justifiable to 
pursue a claim. Draft clause(s) would depend on which approach is adopted. 
D Multi-Principal Closely-Held Companies 
Multi-principal closely-held companies introduce some complications. The 
closely-held companies statute will have to provide for the relations of 
principals among themselves. As for the previous discussion of duties to 
creditors, however, it seems that a relatively simple set of rules will cater for 
the needs of closely-held companies. 
I Relations of principals to each other: default rules 
The closely-held companies statute will need to provide certain rules relating 
to the relations of principals among themselves. Obviously, single-principal 
closely-held companies will be able to disregard these rules. These should be 
"default" rules, able to be modified by agreement.2 19 Default rules make 
matters as simple as possible for basic closely-held companies, while making 
allowance for the particular needs of individual companies if appropriate. 220 
2 Rights of principals 
A consideration of comparative precedent reveals some fairly common themes 
for these default rules. First, they consider the rights of principals. These 
2 17 See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 647 and 710, and cls 243-
249. 
2 18 See Companies Act 1993, s 316. See also Insolvency and Trustee Service "Liquidation 
Surplus Account" (December 2002) Insolvency Quarterly Newsletter, Volume 13, 
Wellington, 5 <http: //www.insolvency. govt.nz> (last accessed 23 September 2006). 
219 Modification of default rules is considered in the next section of this paper - see below, 
Part VD 6 - Modification of default rules . 
220 See also above, Part IV D - Flexibility, and below, Part V D 6 - Modification of default 
rules. 
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include the straightforward rights to be involved in the management of the 
closely-held company and to access information: 
Draft Clause: Rights of Principals 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company have the right to: 
(a) Be involved in the management of the Closely-Held 
Company; 221 and 
(b) Access all information relating to the affairs of the Closely-
Held Company. 222 
3 Shares, interests and distributions 
Second, it is necessary to make provision for dividing the interests in a 
closely-held company among principals. Again, the comparative precedents 
adopt a common approach. Contrary to company law, none of the comparative 
precedents provide for "shares". Only the South African statute makes express 
reference, by providing that interests are to be determined by way of 
percentage. 223 The other statutes are silent, allowing principals to make their 
"f . 224 . h h own arrangements 1 appropnate. W 1t out express agreement to t e 
contrary by the principals, however, the default position is for an even 
distribution of interests. This is a simple and seemingly effective approach, 
particularly for basic equal-share companies that will not vary the pro rata 
distribution of interests. Given a general duty to creditors has already been 
provided elsewhere,225 it is possible to stay silent as to interests, and provide a 
very simple approach to making distributions, for example: 
22 1 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 46(a), Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-116 (1977) , Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), s 404(a), and Partnerships Act 1908, s 27(e). 
222 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 408, and Partnerships 
Act 1908, s 31. 
223 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 30(1). 
224 See, for example Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 12( e ), and Partnerships Act 1908, s 
27(a). See also below, Part VD 6 - Modification of default rules. 
225 See above, Part V C 6 - Proposed duty of care. 
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Draft Clause: Distributions 
A Closely-Held Company must make equal distributions among all its 
Principals.226 
4 Duties of principals to each other 
Next, and again similar to the rights described above, there are some common 
themes in terms of duties of principals. These include the straightforward 
accounting for property, disclosure of information, non-competition, and a 
general duty to comply with the requirements of the statute and operating 
agreement. A draft clause may read: 
Draft Clause: Duties of Principals to Each Other 
(1) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company must: 
(a) Account to the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held 
Company (if any) for any property, profit or other 
benefit derived in the course of conducting the 
Closely-Held Company's business; 227 
(b) Keep the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held 
Company (if any) informed of any matters that may 
reasonably affect the business of the Closely-Held 
Company or the position of the other Principal(s); 228 
(c) Not compete in business with the Closely-Held 
Company or otherwise utilise the information or 
business opportunities of the Closely-Held Company 
for private gain; 229 and 
(d) Not breach, or conduct the business of the Closely-
Held Company in such a way that the Closely-Held 
Company breaches, the Operating Agreement of the 
Closely-Held Company or this Act. 
(2) A Principal that breaches the duty in subsection (1) is liable 
to the Principal(s) of that Closely-Held Company not party to 
the breach that suffer loss due to the breach . 
226 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 46(f) Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-119 (1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), s 405(a). 
227 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(2)(b)(i), Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (1996), s 409(b )(1 ), and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 23 , 24 and 32. 
228 See, for example, Partnerships Act 1908, s 31, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 
42(2)(b)(ii), and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 408. 
229 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(2)(b)(iii), Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (1996), s 409(b)(3), and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 32-33. 
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5 Entry and exit 
It is also necessary to consider entry and exit rights of principals. While the 
comparative precedent is largely uniform in requiring the unanimous consent 
of existing principals to introduce a new principal, there is no consistent 
approach to exit rights of principals. The United States
230 and New Zealand 
partnership law,23
1 for example, provides by default that principals have the 
right to exit at any time. South Africa adopts a more traditional company law 
approach, and does not allow exit at will.
232 
Allowing withdrawal at will would limit the potential for disputes to arise, as 
an aggrieved principal could withdraw at any time. On the other hand, it may 
also lead to business uncertainty if business partners can at any time go their 
own way, taking their capital with them.
233 This business uncertainty may be 
able to be managed through appropriate notice and transitional requirements 
in the statute. 
This paper is inclined towards the United States exit-at-will approach due to 
its ability to limit disputes, but this is a finely balanced matter. A draft clause 
may read: 
Draft Clause: Entry and Exit of Principals 
( 1) 
(2) 
No person may become a Principal of a Closely-Held 
Company without the unanimous consent of the other 
Principal( s ). 234 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company have the right to 
exit from the Closely-Held Company at any time.
235 
230 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-120 
(1977) , Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 602(a). Note however this may be 
due to the United States ' tax position - see Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), 
prefatory note, 1. 
23 1 Partnerships Act 1908, s 29. 
232 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 33-40. 
233 See also Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 206-207. 
234 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 33 , Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat §§ 17-15-122 and 17-15-144(b) (1977), and Partnerships Act 1908, s 
27(g). 
235 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-120 
(1977), Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 602(a), and Partnerships Act 1908, 
s 29. 
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It would, however, also be necessary to include some ancillary provisions 
relating to matters such as the nature of an interest that is transferred contrary 
to subsection (1),236 the process and timeframes for exit under subsection 
(2),237 and for liability before and after exit or entry.238 These are detailed 
matters outside the scope of this paper, however. 
6 Modification of default rules 
As discussed, the above should be default rules to make matters as simple as 
possible for basic closely-held companies.239 Also as discussed, it is necessary 
to make allowances for the particular needs of individual closely-held 
companies. Most importantly, there should be sufficient flexibility to allow 
principals to arrange internal matters to suit their particular circumstances, 
including modifying the default rules. 
The Companies Act anticipates this through the use of company 
· · 240 b 1 d 241 h d 242 d constitutions, ut on y to a egree. T e Unite States an South 
African243 closely-held companies statutes, and even New Zealand partnership 
law,244 expressly provide for much greater flexibility. The default rules 
relating to relationships of principals among themselves, as well as the powers 
and functions of principals, are expressly subject to modification by 
agreement. This greater flexibility seems appropriate for the new closely-held 
companies statute. This paper therefore proposes the following clause: 
236 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 502, and Partnerships 
Act 1908, s 34(1). 
237 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), ss 601 (1) and s 
603(a)(l ). 
238 See, for example, Partnerships Act 1908, ss 20 and 39(3). 
239 See above, Part IV D - Flexibility. 
240 See Companies Act 1993, Part V. 
241 See, in particular, Companies Act 1993, s 31(1). 
242 See, for example, Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107(a)(xi) 
(1977), and Unifom1 Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 103. 
243 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44 and 46. 
244 See Partnerships Act 1908, s 22. 
47 
Draft Clause: Operating Agreement 
( 1) A Closely-Held Company may have an Operating 
Agreement to: 245 
(a) Regulate the operation of the business of that 
Closely-Held Company; and 
(b) Govern the relations among the Principal(s) of that 
Closely-Held Company. 
(2) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held having an Operating 
Agreement must act in accordance with the provisions of 
that Operating Agreement.
246 
Adopting an operating agreement would require the unanimous agreement of 
principals, as an operating agreement is binding on all principals. Unanimous 
agreement would also be required to amend or revoke an operating agreement. 
An additional consequence of this is that it is effectively possible to act 
outside the operating agreement if all principals agree: 
(3) An Operating Agreement may be adopted, replaced , 
amended or revoked at any time by the unanimous 
agreement of the Principal(s) of the Closely-Held 
Company.247 
It is also necessary to consider whether this flexibility to arrange internal 
affairs should be unrestricted, or have certain limitations placed on it. Some 
matters should clearly be capable of being modified by agreement. Matters 
such as the proportion of distributions among principals will be modified 
almost as a matter of course. Other matters, such as entry and exit rights 
should similarly be able to be modified to suit individual circumstances. Even 
the assorted directors ' duties to each other may be dispensed with (or at least 
breaches ratified by unanimous agreement) in appropriate circumstances. All 
the comparative precedents allow for modification of these matters.
248 
245 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 44, Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107(a)(xi) (1977), and Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act (1996), s 103. 
246 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 44(4), and Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (1996), s 409(d). 
247 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44(1) and 44(6), and Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 103(a). 
248 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44 and 46, Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107 (1977), Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996) , s 103, and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 22 and 27. 
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The rights of principals to access information and be involved in the 
management of the closely-held company may be considered more important. 
The general scheme of the proposed closely-held companies statute is that 
substantial regulatory requirements are not required. But this is based on the 
premise that involvement in management obviates the need for regulatory 
requirements. Limiting a principal ' s involvement in management and/or 
access to information is more akin to a company-style approach of separate 
directors and shareholders. As discussed, this is a situation that may be 
abused, hence the need for regulatory requirements. It may therefore not be 
appropriate to allow principals to alter these rights by agreement. 
Although none of comparative precedents prohibit the alteration of these 
rights by agreement, some provide that they may not be unreasonably 
restricted. 
249 
This strikes a balance between respecting the ability of principals 
to decide for themselves250 and acknowledging the accountability concerns if 
someone is a principal of a closely-held company without any access to 
information or involvement in management. The majority of the comparative 
precedent, however, allows even the information and management rights to be 
modified, presumably on the basis of allowing people to decide for 
themselves. The only limitation 1s that such modifications cannot be 
"inconsistent with the law".25 1 
This paper prefers the former view for the reasons outlined, notwithstanding 
the majority of comparative precedent favours the latter. These matters are so 
fundamental that they should not be subject to exclusion: 
(4) The provisions of an Operating Agreement may: 
(a) Modify any of the prov1s1ons of sections 
[Distributions}, [Duties of Principals to Each Other], 
249 
See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 103(b ). 
250 
David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31 , 166. 
25 1 
See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44(l)(b) and 46, and Wyoming 
Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107(a)(xi) (1977). 
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and [Entrr and Exit of Principals} without 
restriction ;2 2 and 
(b) Modify any of the provisions of section [Rights of 
Principals], but only where it is reasonable to do 
so. 253 
7 Creditors and balancing mechanisms 
This paper proposes imposing a duty on principals of closely-held companies 
in favour of creditors. The discussion of these duties above254 used the 
example of one-principal closely-held companies to avoid the potential 
complications that may arise with multi-person companies.255 There does not 
seem to be any reason why matters should become overly-complicated simply 
because multiple principals become involved in a closely-held company. 
There is no difference between several principals and one principal owing the 
duties to creditors as outlined in this paper. 
The balancing mechanisms associated with competing duties are nominally 
more complicated. As discussed, company law traditional uses a duty to "the 
company" to resolve disputes.256 This does not seem necessary, however, even 
in the case of multiple principals. It is difficult to envisage a situation where 
the very basic duty not to prejudice the position of creditors will conflict with 
any of the duties to other principals. In the event that it does, this paper 
proposes a hierarchy of duties,257 with the duty to creditors taking precedence 
over the duties to other principals (so long as there is a causative link between 
the wrongful act and the loss to creditors). For the reasons outlined above, this 
seems a far simpler method than utilising the balancing mechanism.258 
252 
See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), ss 44 and 46, Wyoming Limited 
Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-107 (1977), Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act (1996), s 103, and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 22 and 27 . 
253 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 103(b). 
254 
See above, Part V C 4 - Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
255 See above, n 178. 
256 See above, Part V C 4 - Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
257 See also Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 194-195. 
258 See above, Part V C 4 - Balancing mechanisms versus direct regulatory requirements. 
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E Remedies 
I General: criminal versus civil remedies 
The remedies for any breach of the duties to creditors and other principals also 
need to be considered. There are two broad options for remedies: criminal and 
civil remedies. 
The Companies Act imposes a range of criminal sanctions for breach of its 
assorted regulatory requirements. 259 It is not clear that this is the most 
effective approach for enforcement. Prosecutorial discretion means that many 
of the more-minor offences will never be enforced,260 particularly where no-
one suffers any harm or loss. Moreover, the criminal law has a higher burden 
of proof, is slow, and has more-restrictive rules of evidence. This is likely to 
be aggravated by the complexities of both company law and the modem 
commercial environment.26 1 The criminal law has therefore been described as 
a "blunt and largely ineffective instrument for ensuring that technical or 
administrative duties are complied with".262 
South Africa, for example, has made a conscious choice to "decriminalise" 
many of the breaches of the Close Corporations Act.263 The primary remedy 
for any breach of the law is to impose personal civil liability. The basic 
approach is that a person who does not comply with the regulatory 
requirements of the Close Corporations Act forfeits the privileges associated 
with it - in particular, a person in breach effectively loses the protections of 
259 See Companies Act 1993, Part XXI. 
260 The most high-profile incident is perhaps that involving David Parker and unanimous 
resolutions not to appoint an auditor - see Ian Wishart "Attorney-General Caught Filing False 
Documents" (20 March 2006) Investigate Magazine, New Zealand 
<http ://www.investigatemagazine.com> (last accessed 6 August 2006). 
26 1 See S Du Toit and J J Henning "South Africa - Corporate Law Reform and the 
Empowerment of the Victims of Economic Crime" (1999) 20 Comp Law 277, 281. 
262 S Du Toit and J J Henning "South Africa - Corporate Law Reform and the Empowerment 
of the Victims of Economic Crime", above n 261 , 283. See also the similar recommendations 
of the Cooney Report, above n 43 , paras 13.10-13.15. 
263 S Du Toit and J J Henning "South Africa - Corporate Law Reform and the Empowerment 
of the Victims of Economic Crime", above n 261 , 280-284. See also Cooney Report, above n 
43, paras 13.10-13.12. 
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limited liability by incurring personal liability.
264 Civil liability also has the 
effect of greater emphasis on self-enforcement. This means that enforcement 
will only be pursued where someone has suffered actual hann.
265 
This 
approach seems appropriate. This paper recommends that only civil remedies 
be imposed for breaches of duties. It may be necessary to impose criminal 
remedies for fraudulent behaviour,
266 but this would be an exception to the 
general approach. 
2 Specific remedies 
In terms of specific civil remedies, given the nature of creditors' interests, any 
civil remedy for creditors will almost-inevitably be in the form of damages. 
For breach of duties to other principals, an account of profits will frequently 
arise as the most appropriate remedy, as well as damages. Both of these are 
well-established remedies. 
One additional remedy that may be appropriate, however, is giving the court 
the power to (with the consent of the other principals) expel from the closely-
held company a principal that has breached his/her duties. Such a remedy is 
provided in South Africa.
267 As for the right to exit a closely-held company,
268 
the most effective way to resolve a dispute may be to require quarrelling 
principals to go their separate ways. 
These remedies would be available to the court, notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary in the operating agreement of the closely-held company (in 
particular, relating to the exit of principals). While the operating agreement 
can alter what amounts to a breach, once that breach is established, it should 
not be able to limit the court's available range of remedies. Limiting the 
264 S Du Toit and J J Henning "South Africa - Corporate Law Reform and the Empowerment 
of the Victims of Economic Crime", above n 261,283. 
265 S Du Toit and J J Henning "South Africa - Corporate Law Reform and the Empowerment 
of the Victims of Economic Crime", above n 261,283. This approach was also recommended 
for New Zealand by the Law Commission - see Law Commission Company Law Report, 
above n 1, paras 318,564,565 and 585. 
266 For example, filing false documents or general use of the corporate form to defraud - see 
Companies Act 1993, ss 377,379 and 380. 
267 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 36. 
268 See above, Part VD 5 - Entry and exit. 
available remedies may impair the court's ability to adequately address an 
actual breach and ensure justice in the individual case. 
This paper therefore proposes the following be implemented: 
Draft Clause: Remedies 
(1) Despite anything in the Operating Agreement, where a 
Principal is liable under section [Duties of Principals to 
Creditors] or [Duties of Principals to Each Other], the Court 
may, to the extent that it is just and reasonable, order that 
the Principal: 269 
(a) Pay damages to the person that has suffered loss 
due to the breach; 
(b) Pay a sum up to the amount of personal profit made 
or loss avoided by that Principal to the person that 
has suffered loss due to the breach; and/or 
(c) Be expelled from the Closely-Held Company. 270 
(2) The Court may make an order under subsection (1 )(c) only 
with the consent of the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held 
Company. 
It would also be necessary to provide for ancillary matters related to an 
expulsion order, including the appropriate payout (if any) for the expelled 
partner, the timeframe for such payout, and liability before and after 
expulsion.27 1 The detail of these provisions is outside the scope of this paper. 
F Transacting Business 
It is necessary to provide, for the avoidance of doubt, that closely-held 
companies have full legal capacity to transact business. The alternative, the 
ultra vires doctrine, is not appropriate in the New Zealand environment.272 
This also caters to the potentially informal manner of conducting business by 
closely-held companies, by allowing closely-held companies to undertake all 
actions that the principals themselves are able to do: 
269 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 42(3), and Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (1996), ss 409-410. 
270 See Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 36. 
27 1 These provisions will be similar to those for the exit of principals - see above, Part VD 5 -
Entry and exit. 
272 See Law Commission Company Law Report, above n 1, paras 95 and 342-348. 
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Draft Clause: Capacity of Closely-Held Companies 
A Closely-Held Company has all the rights, powers and legal 
capacity of a natural person.
273 
It is also necessary to consider how closely-held companies go about 
practically transacting business. Obviously, legal persons such as companies 
can not act for themselves. The Companies Act, for example, generally 
empowers the board of a company to manage it.
274 In order to transact 
business on a day-to-day basis companies rely on agents. Theoretically at 
least, board authorisation is necessary to appoint a person an agent of a 
company. This is effectively a delegation of powers. The technicalities of 
agency law are probably beyond the standard closely-held company, however. 
As discussed in the empirical findings of this paper, the majority of a closely-
held company' s business will be transacted by their principals themselves.
275 
Again the comparative precedent provides a more appropriate approach for 
closely-held companies. The default rule is that all principals are deemed to be 
the agents of the closely-held company. This is a simple approach that is 
particularly suitable for closely-held companies: 
Draft Clause: Transacting Business 
( 1) All Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company are its agents 
for the purpose of its business.
276 
New Zealand, however, has a particularly strong focus on form-over-
substance in corporate law.
277 Notwithstanding the generality of proposed 
subsection (1 ), it may be appropriate to provide a safe-harbour provision for 
closely-held companies: 
273 See, for example, Companies Act 1993, ss 15-17, Law Commission Company Law Report 
draft bill, clauses 7-8, Incorporated Societies Act 1908, s 10, Close Corporations Act 1984 
(ZA), s2(2), Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-104 (1977), and 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s l 12(b). 
274 Companies Act 1993, s 128. 
275 See above, Part II C 1 - Synonymity. Note in particular that some 63 per cent of businesses 
have no employees at all - see above, n 28 . 
276 See, for example, Close Corporations Act 1984 (ZA), s 54, Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company Act, Wyo Stat § 17-15-117 (1977), Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996), s 301, and Partnerships Act 1908, ss 8 and 9. 
277 See, for example, Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517 (CA), and Ede (trading 
as Electro Sheetmeta/s Ltd) v JA Russel/ Ltd (200 l) 9 NZCLC 262,539 (HC). 
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(2) Any act by a Principal of a Closely-Held Company who uses 
the expression "[NAME OF PRINCIPAL], Principal , for 
[NAME OF CLOSELY-HELD COMPANY!' in doing the act is 
deemed to be the act of that Closely-Held Company. 
This would deem any transaction using the particular expression to be a 
transaction of the closely-held company. This safe-harbour would provide 
additional guidance for principals of closely-held companies, and ensure that 
potential liability "traps" do not arise through ignorance or oversight of the 
law. 
G Accounting Records and Other Obligations 
One obligation often set out in company law relates to accounting or financial 
reporting obligations. As discussed, however, such requirements can be 
particularly burdensome278 and without apparent benefit for closely-held 
companies.279 Any benefits that may be derived from such financial records, 
can equally be derived from other statutory reporting obligations - in 
particular, annual tax retums.280 A tax return is equally able to achieve any 
goals such as assessing the performance of the business in the previous 
financial year, or imposing business disciplines, or encouraging good decision 
making. This approach is adopted in other jurisdictions.28 1 Any other financial 
records that are practically necessary or useful (for example, in the context of 
considering the solvency test) will be prepared or commissioned by the 
closely-held company as needed or desired, not by regulatory compulsion. 
There does not seem to be any need to set out any other obligations in the 
closely-held companies statute, other than some administrative requirements 
relating to registration and winding up. In relation to the latter, it is probably 
most appropriate to simply incorporate by reference the existing provisions of 
the Companies Act. This is a more complicated and technical area of law that 
278 See above, Part III B - Costs of the Requirements . 
279 See above, Part III A - Regulatory Requirements. 
280 Tax Administration Act 1994, section 33 . In New Zealand at least, there is no obligation to 
file financial reports publicly for the majority of companies. The private nature of tax returns 
therefore does not matter. 
28 1 There are no reporting requirements in either the Wyoming Limited Liability Company 
Act, Wyo Stat title 17 chapter 15 (1977) or the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(1996). 
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is normally conducted by specialists, not by closely-held companies in their 
day-to-day activities. Additional complexity can therefore be justified.
282 
H Formalities 
Finally, in light of the informality of closely-held companies,
283 it may be 
appropriate to provide that even matters required under the statute do not have 
to comply with any particular level of formality ( other than perhaps matters 
which must be sent to the Registrar of Closely-Held Companies, such as 
applications to incorporate a closely-held company): 
Draft Clause: Formalities 
Every matter contemplated by this Act may be done informally 
(including, without limitation, not in writing).
284 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to show how the Companies Act is inadequate .for 
closely-held companies in New Zealand. The essential problem of the 
Companies Act is that the regulatory requirements imposed on directors to 
ensure accountability to shareholders do not have any benefit where the 
directors of a company are also its shareholders. With no benefit, the costs 
arising from such regulatory requirements are therefore unjustified. This 
problem is effectively acknowledged in the Companies Act through the 
assorted concessions to closely-held companies. These concessions have their 
own issues, however, particularly in terms of compliance costs. 
This paper has therefore proposed enacting a new statute designed to meet the 
needs of closely-held companies. It argued that this statute should be in 
addition to the existing Companies Act; it is not possible for one statute to 
cater to the needs of both widely- and closely-held companies. This new 
statute should be based on principles of accessibility and flexibility. From 
these general principles, the empirical findings of this paper, and a 
282 David Goddard "Company Law Reforms - Lessons from the New Zealand Experience", 
above n 31 , 163. 
283 See above, Part II C 2 - Informality. 
284 See, for example, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996), s 103(a). 
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comparison of international precedent, the paper has set out some key features 
that are considered appropriate for a closely-held companies statute in New 
Zealand. 
Perhaps the key feature of the proposed new statute is the removal of the 
distinction between shareholders and directors. This reflects the practical 
realities of a significant majority of companies in New Zealand. On this basis, 
there is no need to impose regulatory requirements on directors in favour of 
shareholders. This addresses a particularly significant issue identified with the 
Companies Act. Forming a closely-held company would be available to 
natural persons, with an upper limit of ten principals. This will ensure that all 
persons can be practicably involved in the management of the closely-held 
company. 
The paper proposed a number of other features. Like the Companies Act, the 
proposed new statute would provide for limited liability. The consequence of 
this is that creditors of closely-held companies may be vulnerable to abuse of 
the closely-held company form. As such, there is a need to impose regulatory 
requirements in favour of creditors. Like the Companies Act, these regulatory 
requirements would take the form of duties to creditors. Unlike the 
Companies Act, however, this duty would be cast in very general terms and be 
owed to creditors directly. This makes the new statute more straightforward 
than the Companies Act. 
The paper also proposes a range of duties in favour of other principals in the 
case of multi-person closely-held companies. This would include duties to 
account for property of the closely-held company, keep the other principals 
informed of relevant matters, and not to compete with the closely-held 
company. In the interests of flexibility, however, most of these duties would 
be modifiable by agreement of the principals. 
Finally, the paper proposed that the statute include simple provisions relating 
to transacting business, eliminating the duplication between accounting and 
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tax reporting requirements and allowing considerable informality for closely-
held companies. 
The net result is a simple, straightforward set of requirements suitable for 
closely-held companies in New Zealand, without onerous or unjustified 
compliance requirements. The paper argues that such a statute should be 
implemented to meet the needs of closely-held companies in New Zealand. 
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APPENDIX: DRAFT NEW ZEALAND CLOSELY-HELD COMPANY 
ACT 
1. Short Title 
This Act may be cited as the Closely-Held Company Act. 
2. Eligibility for Membership of a Closely-Held Company 
A Closely-Held Company must have at least one, but not more than ten , 
Principals, all of whom must be natural persons. 
3. Limited Liability 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company are not liable for the debts of the 
Closely-Held Company. 
4. Duties of Principals to Creditors 
(1) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company must not conduct the business 
of the Closely-Held Company in such a way that causes loss to creditors of 
the Closely-Held Company. 
(2) A Principal that breaches the duty in subsection (1) is liable to creditor(s) that 
suffer loss due to the breach , unless: 
(a) The Principal, in causing the Closely-Held Company to undertake the 
actions that are alleged to have cause the breach : 
(i) Did not have a personal interest in the actions, or the outcome of the 
actions; 
(ii) Acted in an informed manner; and 
(iii) Had a rational belief that the actions would not cause loss to 
creditors; or 
(b) The actions that are alleged to have caused the breach would have been 
undertaken by a reasonably prudent business person acting as a 
Principal of the Closely-Held Company. 
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(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(iii) , a belief is rational unless it is a 
belief such that no reasonable person in the position of the Principal could 
hold it. 
( 4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b ), the actions that are alleged to have 
caused the breach shall be deemed to be reasonable if, at the time the 
actions are undertaken : 
(a) The Closely-Held Company is able to pay its debts as they become due 
in the normal course of business; and 
(b) The value of the Closely-Held Company's assets is greater than the 
value of its liabilities, including contingent liabilities. 
5. Rights of Principals 
The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company have the right to: 
(a) Be involved in the management of the Closely-Held Company; and 
(b) Access all information relating to the affairs of the Closely-Held 
Company. 
6. Distributions 
A Closely-Held Company must make equal distributions among all its Principals. 
7. Duties of Principals to Each Other 
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(1) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company must: 
(a) Account to the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company (if any) for 
any property, profit or other benefit derived in the course of conducting 
the Closely-Held Company's business; 
(b) Keep the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company (if any) 
informed of any matters that may reasonably affect the business of the 
Closely-Held Company or the position of the other Principal(s); 
(c) Not compete in business with the Closely-Held Company or otherwise 
utilise the information or business opportunities of the Closely-Held 
Company for private gain; and 
(d) Not breach, or conduct the business of the Closely-Held Company in 
such a way that the Closely-Held Company breaches, the Operating 
Agreement of the Closely-Held Company or this Act. 
(2) A Principal that breaches the duty in subsection (1) is liable to the 
Principal(s) of that Closely-Held Company not party to the breach that suffer 
loss due to the breach . 
8. Entry and Exit of Principals 
(1) No person may become a Principal of a Closely-Held Company without the 
unanimous consent of the other Principal(s). 
(2) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held Company have the right to exit from the 
Closely-Held Company at any time. 
9. Operating Agreement 
(1) A Closely-Held Company may have an Operating Agreement to: 
(a) Regulate the operation of the business of that Closely-Held Company; 
and 
(b) Govern the relations among the Principal( s) of that Closely-Held 
Company. 
(2) The Principal(s) of a Closely-Held having an Operating Agreement must act 
in accordance with the provisions of that Operating Agreement. 
(3) An Operating Agreement may be adopted, replaced , amended or revoked at 
any time by the unanimous agreement of the Principal(s) of the Closely-Held 
Company. 
(4) The provisions of an Operating Agreement may: 
(a) Modify any of the provisions of sections 6 (Distributions) , 7 (Duties of 
Principals to Each Other) , and 8 (Entry and Exit of Principals) without 
restriction; and 
(b) Modify any of the provisions of section 5 (Rights of Principals), but only 
where it is reasonable to do so. 
10. Remedies 
(1) Despite anything in the Operating Agreement, where a Principal is liable 
under section 4 (Duties of Principals to Creditors) or 7 (Duties of Principals to 
Each Other), the Court may, to the extent that it is just and reasonable , order 
that the Principal: 
(a) Pay damages to the person that has suffered loss due to the breach; 
(b) Pay a sum up to the amount of personal profit made or loss avoided by 
that Principal to the person that has suffered loss due to the breach; 
and/or 
(c) Be expelled from the Closely-Held Company. 
(2) The Court may make an order under subsection (1 )(c) only with the consent 
of the other Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company. 
11. Capacity of Closely-Held Companies 
A Closely-Held Company has all the rights, powers and legal capacity of a 
natural person . 
12. Transacting Business 
(1) All Principal(s) of the Closely-Held Company are its agents for the purpose of 
its business. 
(2) Any act by a Principal of a Closely-Held Company who uses the expression 
"[NAME OF PRINCIPAL], Principal , for [NAME OF CLOSELY-HELD 
COMPANY!' in doing the act is deemed to be the act of that Closely-Held 
Company. 
13. Formalities 
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Every matter contemplated by this Act may be done informally (including, without 
limitation , not in writing). 
14. Formation, Liquidations and Registrar 
The following provisions of the Companies Act 1993 apply to Closely-Held 
Companies registered under this Act as if they were companies incorporated 
under the Companies Act 1993: 
(a) Part II (relating to incorporation); 
(b) Part XVI (relating to liquidations); and 
(c) Part XX (relating to the Registrar of Companies). 
NB. Sections 1 and 14 did not appear in the body of the paper. They are 
merely provided as an indication of these matters may be addressed. 
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